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ABSTRACT
 This Article argues for a “public governance duty” to help manage excessive risk-taking by
systemically important firms.  Although governments worldwide, including the United States,
have issued an array of regulations to attempt to curb that risk-taking by aligning managerial
and investor interests, those regulations implicitly assume that investors would oppose excessively
risky business ventures.  That leaves a critical misalignment: because much of the harm from a
systemically important firm’s failure would be externalized onto the public, including ordinary
citizens impacted by an economic collapse, such a firm can engage in risk-taking ventures with
positive expected value to its investors but negative expected value to the public.  The Article
analyzes why corporate governance law should, and shows how it feasibly could, take the public
interest into account.
INTRODUCTION
Should corporate governance law take into account risk-taking that
could systemically harm the public?  Corporate risk-taking is certainly eco-
nomically necessary and often desirable.1  Successful risk-taking increases
1 Cf. Gabriel Jime´nez et al., How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking? (Fed.
Reserve Bank of S.F. Working Paper Series No. 2007-23, 2007), http://www.frbsf.org/eco-
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profitability, thereby enhancing welfare by generating jobs and purchasing
power.2  But corporate risk-taking can sometimes cause harm.  There is wide-
spread agreement that excessive corporate risk-taking was one of the primary
causes of the systemic economic collapse that became the 2008–2009 global
financial crisis (the “financial crisis”).3  There is also a consensus that existing
regulatory measures to curb that risk-taking and prevent another crisis are
inadequate.4
Many of the regulatory responses to the financial crisis, both in the
United States and abroad, seek to mitigate excessive risk-taking by systemi-
cally important financial firms.5  Various of those responses are designed to
control that risk-taking by aligning managerial and investor interests to
reduce agency costs and make managers less likely to engage their firms in
risky business ventures that could jeopardize investors.  These responses
nomic-research/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-23bk.pdf (arguing that increas-
ing competition among banks increases the need to engage in risk-taking in order to
maintain profitability).
2 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and
the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 221–22 (2009) (observing that students
of American law and economic history agree that much of the nation’s technological pro-
gress and economic growth can be partly attributed to bold corporate risk-taking).
3 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, xviii–xix (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_
media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (identifying excessive risk-taking as a primary
cause of the financial crisis); Jacob J. Lew, Opinion, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky Practices in
the Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-
lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-practices-in-the-past/2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-d0b9
3ff613d5_story.html?utm_term=.d1eddb5d0774 (explaining that U.S. Treasury Secretary
Lew repeatedly attributes the financial crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms);
The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.eco
nomist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-
years-article (identifying excessive risk-taking as one of three causes of the financial crisis,
the other causes being irresponsible lending and regulators being asleep at the wheels).
4 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2015, at B1 (observing the “troubling reality highlighted at a conference . . . at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston” that “policy makers have made little progress in figuring
out how they might actually” prevent another financial crisis).  Donald Kohn, former Vice
Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, observed at the conference that the
Federal Reserve “doesn’t really have the tools” to prevent another crisis. Id. at B3.  Luc
Laeven, European Central Bank Director General for Research, summarized the consensus
reached at the conference: “Both monetary policy and macroprudential [regulatory] pol-
icy are not really very effective.” Id.  He then asked, “Do we have other policies?” Id.  This
Article seeks to provide an answer.
5 Cf. infra Part I (discussing regulatory responses to mitigate excessive corporate risk-
taking by systemically important firms).  This Article’s references to systemically important
firms, systemically important financial firms, and systemically important financial institu-
tions all mean financial firms that are systemically important.  Very large and highly inter-
connected non-financial firms that might be systemically important are beyond the
Article’s scope.
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implicitly assume that the investors themselves would oppose excessively risky
business ventures.
That assumption, however, is flawed, and therefore financial regulation
based on the assumption’s validity is unreliable.  The assumption is flawed
because what constitutes “excessive” risk-taking depends on the observer.
Risk-taking is excessive from a given observer’s standpoint if it has a negative
expected value to that observer (i.e., the expected costs to that observer
exceed the expected benefits).  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that investors
would oppose risky business ventures that have a negative expected value to
them.  The problem, however, is that systemically important firms—the pri-
mary focus of post-financial crisis regulation, and also the focus of this Arti-
cle—can engage in risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to
their investors but a negative expected value to the public.  That is because
much of the systemic harm from such a firm’s failure would be externalized6
onto other market participants as well as onto the public, including ordinary
citizens impacted by an economic collapse.7
This misalignment occurs because corporate governance law requires
managers of a firm—by which this Article means the most senior managers
who have ultimate responsibility to manage the firm, such as a corporation’s
directors—to view the consequences of their firm’s actions, and thus to view
the expected value of corporate risk-taking, only from the standpoint of the
firm and its investors.8  That perspective ignores externalities9 caused by the
6 This could be described as a type of “tragedy of the commons,” insofar as market
participants suffer from the actions of other market participants.  But it also is a more
standard externality insofar as non-market participants (i.e., the ordinary citizens impacted
by an economic collapse) suffer from the actions of market participants; cf. Sean J. Griffith,
Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1153, 1156, 1210 (2012) (describing a similar misalignment as a free-rider and moral
hazard problem).
7 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008); see also John Craw-
ford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 138
(2015) (observing that “financial firms . . . are under-incentivized to insure at the optimal
level, given the fact that the potential systemic costs of their own failure would be borne
primarily by others”).  The collapse of Lehman Brothers illustrates this.  Lehman Brothers
had engaged in highly profitable, but also high-risk and high-leverage, business strategies.
The financial stresses caused by “defaults in the subprime mortgage and commercial real
estate markets” then caused Lehman Brothers to default, roiling financial markets and
threatening the entire U.S. economy with collapse.  Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and
Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured
Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1115–18 (2011).
8 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 9–10 (10th
ed. 2011); cf. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB
SURCHARGE 1 (2015) [hereinafter BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/gsib-methodology-paper-
20150720.pdf (observing that systemically important financial institutions “themselves lack
sufficient incentives to take precautions against their own failures”).  In some jurisdictions,
however, managers may also be allowed or required to take into account other interests,
such as those of employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and communities, see infra note
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actions.  In general, that makes sense because myriad externalities result
from corporate risk-taking;10 it would not be feasible to take all those exter-
nalities into account.  Even the Federal Reserve’s regulations requiring sys-
temically important financial firms to establish risk committees direct those
committees to consider risks to the firm, not to the public.11  But risk-taking
that causes the failure of a systemically important firm could trigger a dom-
ino-like collapse of other firms or markets, causing systemic externalities that
damage the economy and harm the public.12  This Article argues that corpo-
rate governance law should, and feasibly could, take into account risk-taking
that causes systemic externalities.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines the “macroprudential”
regulatory responses to the financial crisis—that is, regulatory responses
intended to protect against “systemic” risk to the integrity of the financial
system13—that purport to mitigate excessive corporate risk-taking by systemi-
cally important firms.14  To the extent these responses attempt to mitigate
that risk-taking by aligning interests, they seek to align managerial and inves-
tor interests (collectively, the “firm’s interests”).  That leaves a critical mis-
alignment: even if those interests could be perfectly aligned, that would be
insufficient to control excessive risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.
Part I also shows that the regulatory responses to the financial crisis that pro-
fess to mitigate excessive corporate risk-taking in other ways (i.e., without
aligning managerial and investor interests) are also inadequate to prevent
systemic externalities.
Part II examines and compares possible regulatory redesign options to
help align the firm’s interests with the public’s interests, in order to control
excessive risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.  Although financial
regulation traditionally focuses on regulating substance, such as imposing
capital-adequacy standards, this Part argues that these redesign options
should additionally focus on reforming a firm’s governance.
Part III analyzes how a firm’s governance should be reformed to reduce
systemic externalities.  To that end, it first shows how imposing a public gov-
ernance duty to help align the firm’s interests with the public’s interests
would fit within corporate governance legal theory.  Thereafter, it shows how
such a duty could be feasibly and efficiently implemented.  Finally, the
160 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania constituency statute), and “the
entire national economy,” see infra note 158 (discussing legislation in Iceland).
9 I am talking, of course, about non-investor externalities; cf. Griffith, supra note 6, at
1210 (in the context of derivatives transactions, observing that “[b]ecause no private party
can enjoy the full benefit of eliminating systemic risk, no private party has an incentive to
fully internalize the cost of doing so”).
10 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
12 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 198.
13 Id. (defining systemic risk).
14 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 5–13; infra notes 15–68 (discussing why such risk-
taking occurs).
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Appendix to the Article proposes possible model language, in the form of a
Public Governance Duty Act, for regulation imposing the duty.
I. THE REGULATORY MISALIGNMENT
Various types of macroprudential regulatory responses to the financial
crisis purport to mitigate excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically
important firms.15  Certain of these responses attempt to mitigate that risk-
taking by aligning managerial and investor interests.  Thus, requiring a sys-
temically important firm to tie management compensation to the firm’s long-
term performance is intended to better align managerial and investor inter-
ests by penalizing managers who engage such firms in risky ventures that,
notwithstanding short-term appeal, ultimately jeopardize investors.16  Requir-
ing a systemically important firm to maintain so-called contingent capital, in
which debt securities convert into equity securities upon specified conditions,
is designed to motivate holders of those convertible debt securities to better
monitor and impose covenants against excessive risk-taking, since they more
clearly bear the risk of the firm failing.17  As shown below, however, these
types of responses are insufficient: even if managerial and investor interests
to engage in risk-taking could be perfectly aligned, that would be insufficient
to control risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.
Other types of regulatory responses that are currently used to control
excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms do not profess
to align managerial and investor interests.  Because there is no formal catego-
rization of macroprudential regulatory responses,18 there is no formal cate-
gorization of this subset of responses.  For discussion purposes, this Article
15 Recall that macroprudential regulation focuses on the integrity of the financial sys-
tem, as a system, in contrast to microprudential regulation, which focuses on the safety and
soundness of individual firms. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  These forms of
regulation have an indirect overlap: reducing the likelihood that individual firms will fail
can help to partially reduce systemic risk by making it less likely that individual systemically
important firms will fail.  Microprudential regulation does not, however, generally address
correlations among failing firms, nor does it address how to protect the financial system as
a system.  Rizwaan Jameel Mokal argues that trying to make the financial system stable by
making it less likely that individual systemically important firms will fail can actually
increase financial instability.  Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bank-
ruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 20 (2015).
16 See infra Section I.A.
17 See infra Section I.B.  These convertible debt securities are sometimes called contin-
gent convertible securities, or “CoCos.” See, e.g., John Glover & Tom Beardsworth, Contin-
gent Convertibles, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 29, 2016), http://www.bloombergview.com/
quicktake/contingent-convertible-bonds.
18 Policymakers and regulators tend to view macroprudential regulation as a loose
assortment of “tools” in their toolkit. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Implementing
Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal Considerations 12–13 (Jan. 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the “emergent macropruden-
tial toolkit as currently constituted”).  Even the theoretical scholarship on macroprudential
regulation takes a somewhat similar ad hoc approach, yielding “propositions [that] can
serve as a tool kit” for regulatory scrutiny.  Daniel Awrey, Colleen Baker & Katharina Pistor,
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categorizes these responses along functional lines: regulation attempting to
limit the so-called too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem,19 regulation implement-
ing the so-called Volcker Rule,20 and regulation imposing capital and other
types of firm-specific financial requirements.21  Some of these categories
overlap.22  However one categorizes these responses, however, the analysis
below shows—and policymakers agree23—that they too are inadequate to
control risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.
A. Compensation
One approach to control excessive corporate risk-taking is to better align
managerial compensation with investor interests.  To this end, commenta-
tors, legislators, and regulators have proposed aligning the long-term com-
pensation of senior and secondary managers of systemically important firms
with the interests of those firms’ investors.24  The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, is authorized to enforce the
recovery of bonuses paid to chief executive officers and chief financial
officers of public companies that issue financial restatements due to material
noncompliance “with any financial reporting requirement under the securi-
ties laws” resulting from misconduct.25  The SEC also requires all firms whose
compensation policies create risks that are “reasonably likely to have a mate-
rial adverse effect” on the firm to disclose, in the form of a “narrative dis-
course,” how those compensation policies relate to risk management and
risk-taking incentives.26
An Overview of the Legal Theory of Finance 2 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
19 See infra Section I.C.
20 See infra Section I.D.
21 See infra Section I.E.
22 For example, regulation imposing capital and other types of firm-specific financial
requirements can overlap with TBTF regulation because both can make it less likely that a
TBTF firm will fail.
23 See Appelbaum, supra note 4.
24 For a comparison of senior and secondary manager compensation, including an
argument that the latter is at least as important as the former, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J.
ON REG. 457 (2009).
25 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 951–56, 971, 972, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–906, 1915 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1 (2012)) (adding §§ 14A, 10C, 14(i), 10D, 14(j), 14(a)(1), and 14B to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899, which extended the federal
government’s regulatory reach into a company’s internal governance and compensation
practices even further); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat.
745, 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012)).
26 Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1704 (2011) (quoting Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239,
240, 249, 274)).
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Even greater restrictions were placed on firms receiving bailout moneys
in connection with the financial crisis.  For example, these firms had ceilings
imposed on the compensation payable to the five highest-earning executives,
in order to eliminate incentives to take “unnecessary and excessive risks that
threaten the value of such” a firm.27  These firms also were required to have
an independent “Board Compensation Committee,” which would meet “to
discuss and evaluate employee compensation plans in light of an assessment
of any risk posed to [such a firm] from such plans.”28  Additionally, they were
required to recover any form of “incentive compensation paid to a senior
executive officer and any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employ-
ees” if the financial statements or other criteria on which the compensation
was based later is found to be “materially inaccurate.”29  The Dodd-Frank Act
extends certain of these requirements to firms that are required to file peri-
odic reports to the SEC.30  It also requires firms to implement shareholder
advisory voting on executive compensation, commonly known as “say-on-
pay.”31
Nonetheless, a misalignment remains because these compensation
requirements focus exclusively on the effect of risk-taking on the firm and its
investors.  None of these requirements takes into account the potential for
risk-taking to create systemic externalities.32  These requirements therefore
will be insufficient to control that risk-taking.33
27 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115,
517 (adding § 111(b)(3)(A) to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)));
see also id. (amending § 111 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to
include § 111(b)(3)(A)) (preventing the executives with the top five highest salaries of any
TARP company from receiving compensation incentivizing them to take “unnecessary and
excessive risks that threaten the value” of the firm).
28 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001 (adding § 111(b)(4) to the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act).
29 Id. (adding § 111(b)(3)(B) to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act).
30 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 954 (requiring senior managers to return any compensa-
tion they received in the past three years based on erroneous financial reports submitted to
the SEC).
31 Id. § 951; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-
Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm.
32 Cf. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER
340–43 (1950) (arguing that board alignment with shareholder interests would weaken the
desirable capacity of managers to manage in the public interest); Jesse D. Gossett, Note,
Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-
Taking, the Regulatory Response, and Common Sense Solutions, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 51, 63
(2013) (observing that the compensation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act “will do nothing to actually reduce the level of systemic risk at financial
institutions which means [such provisions] will be largely ineffective at holding off the next
financial crisis”).
33 Professors Bebchuk and Spamann have partly recognized that insufficiency, arguing
that compensation of a bank’s “top executives” should be tied not only to common stock
value but also to preferred share and bond value in order to better protect the government
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B. Contingent Capital
Contingent capital regulation assumes that a firm’s creditors—who
would not benefit from the firm’s increased profitability but could be
harmed by its failure—should be good monitors against excessive risk-taking
if they more clearly bear the risk of the firm failing.  To assign more of that
risk to creditors, such regulation requires certain debt claims to convert to
equity upon specified (deteriorating) financial conditions.34  To reduce the
chance those conditions will occur, creditors impose even stricter loan cove-
nants on their debtor-firms.35  That aligns managerial and investor interests
by contractually restricting risk-taking.
Contingent capital regulation is unlikely to be sufficient to control risk-
taking that causes systemic externalities.  Admittedly, it might indirectly and
partially reduce systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that any given firm
will fail.36  As a practical matter, however, the firm and its shareholders will
want the firm to be able to engage in risk-taking in order to make profits.37
Firms customarily offer creditors higher interest rates to compensate for
allowing looser covenants,38 and experience shows that creditors often “go
for the gold,” choosing the higher rates over stronger covenants.39  If private
and public interests were perfectly aligned, the pricing theoretically should
offset the risks.  But in negotiating loan covenants, creditors have no incen-
as a guarantor of bank deposits.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bank-
ers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 254 (2010).  In that context, they examine “corporate governance
measures aiming to align management with shareholders” and conclude, as do I, that such
measures will not fix the insufficiency and might even make it worse. Id. at 274–75.  Unlike
my Article, however, they do not consider how corporate governance measures might be
reformed to help align management with societal interests.
34 Debt securities that are required to convert to equity securities upon certain condi-
tions, such as the debtor-firm’s equity capital falling below a pre-set minimum, are often
called contingent convertible securities or, more simply, “CoCos.” See supra note 17. Con-
tingent capital regulation also serves to convert debt claims of a troubled firm into equity
interests, thereby reducing the likelihood that the firm will default. See infra note 62.
35 Cf. Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L.
113, 127 (2010) (footnote omitted) (observing that “although the law grants creditors no
special rights against managers, creditors can acquire substantial control powers over cor-
porate operations by bargaining for both positive and negative covenants”).
36 See supra note 15.
37 As discussed, corporate risk-taking is economically necessary and desirable. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text. But cf. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic
Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 54 (2014) (arguing that because sys-
temic risks cannot be avoided by investment diversification, shareholders can be indirectly
harmed by excessive risk-taking that triggers a systemic collapse).
38 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 647, 651 n.12 (1996).
39 Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 29, 1993), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1993-03-28/bondholder-beware-
value-subject-to-change-without-notice (“Bondholders can—and will—fuss all they like.
But the reality is, their options are limited: Higher returns or better protection [in the
form of stronger covenants].  Most investors will continue to go for the gold.”).
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tive to control systemic externalities.  They therefore will not price in the
systemic consequences of risk-taking.40
Also, contingent capital regulation could have unintended conse-
quences.  Because it is riskier, debt issued as contingent capital would be
more expensive than non-convertible debt.41  Capitalizing a systemically
important firm with lots of contingent capital, in order to make the firm less
likely to fail, might also motivate the firm’s managers to take even greater
corporate risks.42
The foregoing discussion has focused on controlling excessive corporate
risk-taking by aligning managerial and investor interests, showing that
existing regulatory responses are insufficient to prevent systemic externali-
ties.  This Article next examines whether regulatory responses that profess to
control excessive corporate risk-taking in other ways could prevent systemic
externalities.
C. Too Big to Fail
Another type of regulatory response to control excessive corporate risk-
taking focuses on the “Too Big to Fail” problem: that systemically important
firms might engage in excessive risk-taking because they would profit by a
success and be bailed out by the government in case of a failure.  This is a
problem of moral hazard, that persons protected from the negative conse-
quences of their risky actions will be more tempted to take risks.43
TBTF regulation seeks to reduce that moral hazard by limiting the gov-
ernment’s authority to provide bailouts.  In the United States, for example, it
restricts the Federal Reserve’s authority to act as a lender of last resort to a
failing financial institution.44
40 Nor are creditor-imposed loan covenants likely to protect the financial system, as a
system. Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 87 (2013) (examining how
macroprudential regulation should help to protect the financial system, as a system).
41 See, e.g., Eric S. Halperin, CoCo Rising: Can the Emergence of Novel Hybrid Securities
Protect from Future Liquidity Crises?, 8 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 15, 21–24 (2011) (explaining
why issuing CoCos to investors may be more expensive than issuing ordinary debt).
42 Cf. George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 30 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2011), https://business.illinois.edu/gpen-
nacc/ConCap030211.pdf (observing that a “bank that issues contingent capital faces a
moral hazard incentive to increase its assets’ jump risks”).  Another possible unintended
consequence of contingent capital is that “by requiring banks to issue more debt, it might
prompt some to reduce their ratios of equity to assets.  This added leverage will leave the
system more susceptible to distress in bad times.”  Editorial, A Bad Way to Make Banks Safe,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-11-09/
a-bad-way-to-make-banks-safe.
43 See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS (2004).
44 The Dodd-Frank Act limits the authority of the Federal Reserve to make emergency
loans under § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 2113, (2010) (codified
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This aspect of TBTF regulation is unlikely to be sufficient to control
excessive risk-taking, and it might even increase systemic externalities.  It is
unlikely to be sufficient to control excessive risk-taking because the misalign-
ment discussed in this Article results from externalized harm, not from reli-
ance on a bailout.45  And it might inadvertently increase systemic
externalities by preventing the government from bailing out a failing systemi-
cally important firm.46
TBTF regulation also focuses on making systemically important firms
less likely to need a government bailout if they suffer devastating losses—
whether or not those losses are caused by excessive risk-taking.47  The Dodd-
Frank Act, for example, requires systemically important firms to file so-called
living wills, setting forth how they could liquidate with minimal systemic
impact.48  Because this focus of TBTF regulation does not purport to control
excessive corporate risk-taking, it is not central to this Article’s analysis.49
at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).  Dodd-Frank amended that subsection to require the Federal
Reserve to consult with and receive approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure
that any emergency lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid a
financially failing firm. Id.
45 See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1376 (2011); John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic
Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 825 (2011) (observing that the Dodd-Frank Act prevents federal
government lender-of-last-resort assistance to nonbank financial firms that are solvent but
illiquid, thereby forcing “some firms into an arguably unnecessary liquidation”).
47 Yet another focus of TBTF regulation is on reducing the TBTF nature of systemi-
cally important firms, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to break up large banks.
See Joseph Lawler, Warren Introduces Glass-Steagall Bill to Break Up Big Banks, WASH. EXAMINER
(July 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/warren-introduces-glass-steagall-bill-
to-break-up-big-banks/article/2567757.
48 See, e.g., Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer:
What You Need to Know Now, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2012) (“As part of the goal to
remove the risks to the financial system posed by ‘too big to fail’ institutions, § 165(d) of
the Dodd-Frank Act requires ‘systemically important financial institutions’ to create ‘living
wills’ to facilitate ‘rapid and orderly resolution, in the event of material financial distress or
failure.’” (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1405 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5325 (2012)))).
49 The living-will requirement is unlikely, in any event, to eliminate systemic externali-
ties caused by the failure of a TBTF firm.  In my years as a workout and bankruptcy lawyer,
I rarely saw a firm’s failure that accurately reflected, much less closely resembled, expecta-
tions about the firm when it was profitable.  Furthermore, living wills do not prevent the
concurrent failure of multiple otherwise-TBTF firms from, collectively, having a systemic
impact. Cf. Victoria McGrane, FDIC Chief: Big Failure Won’t Harm the System, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 2015, at C1 (observing that some in Congress “doubt regulators could handle the
failure of multiple major firms at the same time”).  The financial crisis demonstrated that a
concurrence of failures is likely when the causes of the failures are interconnected, such as
an industry-wide overreliance on credit ratings. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83, 404–05
(2008); cf. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair of Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics: Macropruden-
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D. Volcker Rule
In response to the financial crisis, former Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker proposed that because bank deposits are federally guaranteed,
deposit-taking banks should be restricted from making risky investments.50
This proposal became known as the “Volcker Rule.”51  The substance of the
Volcker Rule was implemented by the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits banks
from (1) “engag[ing] in proprietary trading”52 or (2) “acquir[ing] or
retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or spon-
sor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”53
The Volcker Rule is also insufficient to control risk-taking that causes
systemic externalities.  Besides the Rule’s limited application (to specific
investments by banks), its regulatory rationale is microprudential, protecting
the safety and soundness of individual firms.  As with any other type of
microprudential regulation, the Volcker Rule indirectly and partially reduces
systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that an individual bank covered by
the rule will fail; but it does not address correlations among failing firms, nor
tial Supervision and Monetary Policy in the Post-Crisis World 3 (Oct. 11, 2010) (transcript
available at 2010 WL 3952044 (F.R.B.)) (attributing the financial crisis to concurrences of
interrelated failures).
50 Paul Volcker, Op-Ed., How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/31volcker.html?pagewanted=all.
51 David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts Power away from
Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html.
52 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A).  “Proprietary trading” is defined as
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or [relevant]
nonbank financial company . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell, or other-
wise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or con-
tract, or any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal
banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission . . . determine [by rule].
Id. § 1851(h)(4).  Reference to a “trading account” is intended to primarily cover short-
term trades, though federal regulators could expand that coverage. See id. § 1851(h)(6)
(defining a trading account as “any account used for acquiring or taking positions in the
securities and instruments [described in the definition of proprietary trading] principally
for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order
to profit from short-term price movements), and any such other accounts as the appropri-
ate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission . . . determine [by rule]”).
53 Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B).  Notwithstanding these restrictions, trading is permitted “in
connection with underwriting or market-making-related activities,” to the extent that
either does not “exceed the . . . near term demands of clients, customers, or counterpar-
ties”; “on behalf of customers”; or by an insurance business “for the general account of the
[insurance] company.” See id. §§ 1851(d)(1)(B), (D), (F).
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does it address the reasons why firms may want to engage in excessive risk-
taking or how to protect the financial system as a system.54
E. Firm-Specific Financial Requirements
In theory, firm-specific financial requirements, such as capital and sol-
vency requirements, could help to control excessive corporate risk-taking by
systemically important firms.55  For example, some of the largest systemically
important firms are believed to have a funding advantage, “deriv[ing] from
the belief of some creditors that the government might act to prevent [such a
firm] from defaulting on its debts.”56  That funding advantage “creates an
incentive for [those firms] to take on even more leverage and make them-
selves even more systemic (in order to increase the value of the [funding
advantage] subsidy).”57  Imposing a financial surcharge on those systemically
important firms could, if calibrated correctly, “offset [that] subsidy and
thereby cancel out these undesirable effects.”58
In practice, however, governments have not been using firm-specific
financial requirements to control excessive corporate risk-taking because that
“would require more precision . . . than is now attainable.”59  Instead, firm-
specific financial requirements are being imposed to try to make systemically
important firms more internally robust, so (as is the goal of TBTF regula-
tion60) they will be less likely to need a government bailout if they suffer
54 See supra note 15; see also Crawford, supra note 7, at 116 (“While prudential oversight
is extremely important for addressing bank-like risks, it has never been enough on its own
to prevent panics.”).  The Volcker Rule may also be counterproductive.  Moody’s has
warned, for example, that it might “diminish the flexibility and profitability of banks’ valua-
ble market-making operations and place them at a competitive disadvantage to firms not
constrained by the rule.”  Edward Wyatt, Regulators to Set Forth Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/business/volcker-rule-to-take-shape-this-
week.html; see also George W. Madison et al., Reconsidering Three Dodd-Frank Initiatives: The
Volcker Rule, Limitations on Federal Reserve Section 13(3) Lending Powers, and SIFI Thresholds, 34
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., no. 6, 2015, at 6–7 (arguing that the Volcker Rule will
not mitigate systemic risk because its effect will be to move trading activity from banks,
which are subject to capital and liquidity requirements, to other market participants that
are not subject to the same prudential regulation; and that restricting banks from engaging
in proprietary trading may actually aggravate liquidity problems).  The ultimate value of
the Volcker Rule will be an empirical question: whether the benefits of its limitation on
proprietary trading will outweigh profits lost by losing the ability to engage in such trading.
55 But cf. E.J. Kane, Hair of the Dog That Bit Us: The Insufficiency of New and Improved
Capital Requirements, in THE FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A RETRO-
SPECTIVE 377, 377 (James R. Barth & George G. Kaufman eds., 2016) (arguing that forcing
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) to show more accounting capital will
do little to curb their enhanced appetite for risk-taking that could cause the firm’s failure).
56 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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losses—whether or not those losses are caused by excessive risk-taking.61
Because this focus of firm-specific financial requirements does not purport to
control excessive corporate risk-taking, it is not central to this Article’s
analysis.62
It nonetheless may be worth observing that this focus of firm-specific
financial requirements is unlikely to eliminate systemic externalities.  While
making systemically important firms more internally robust should partially
reduce systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that any given firm will fail,
these requirements are effectively microprudential—regulating the safety
and soundness of individual firms.63  Firm-specific financial requirements do
not purport to (macroprudentially) protect the integrity of the financial sys-
tem as a system.  Such financial requirements might also be counterproduc-
tive, making firms that are subject to them less competitive,64 driving “credit
61 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 2.  The Fed-
eral Reserve has also characterized this use of firm-specific financial requirements as reduc-
ing a systemically important firm’s “systemic footprint.” Id. at iii.
62 This Article focuses on controlling excessive corporate risk-taking as a means of
reducing systemic externalities.  As discussed above, see supra notes 47–49 and accompany-
ing text, other regulatory approaches to try to reduce systemic externalities are not central
to this Article’s analysis.  Other such regulatory approaches include the use of contingent
capital regulation to convert debt claims of a troubled firm into equity interests, thereby
reducing the likelihood that the firm will default, and the FDIC-inspired strategy for
administratively resolving a large complex financial institution. Cf. Mike Konczal, Sheila
Bair: Dodd-Frank Really Did End Taxpayer Bailouts, WASH. POST (May 18, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/18/sheila-bair-dodd-frank-really-did-
end-taxpayer-bailouts/ (“[T]he FDIC has come up with a viable strategy for resolving a
large complex financial institution. . . . The FDIC will take control of a holding company
and put creditors and shareholders into a receivership where they, not taxpayers, will
absorb any losses.  This will allow the subsidiaries to remain operational, avoiding systemic
disruptions, as the overall entity is unwound over time.”).
63 See supra note 15; cf. supra note 36 and accompanying text (making a similar obser-
vation in the context of contingent capital regulation); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1580 (2014)
(observing that although “solvency regulation . . . attempts to safeguard the financial
strength of individual insurers . . . the core goal of even solvency regulation has long been
understood to be protecting consumers by ensuring that insurers have the financial capac-
ity to pay policyholder claims when they become due” (footnote omitted)).
64 Cf. Nabila Ahmed & Sridhar Natarajan, Jefferies Is Poaching the Big Banks’ Loan Busi-
ness with Help from the Fed, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-05-29/jefferies-poaching-big-banks-loan-business-with-help-from-fed (report-
ing that unregulated hedge funds “step in to fill a void” when regulated banks are
restricted from fulfilling market needs); Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being
Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/econ-
omy/the-cost-of-the-financial-crisis-is-still-being-tallied.html (observing that regulations
that require financial institutions to increase capital cushions to buffer against risks and
potential losses have been criticized for cutting into global economic output and reducing
jobs).  The potential for firm-specific financial requirements to make firms less competitive
is a result of Congress’ “mandate provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, which instructs the
[Federal Reserve] Board to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States”
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intermediation to the less-regulated shadow banking sector,”65 misleading
regulators about safety,66 creating “perverse incentives,”67 and inadvertently
hurting the economy.68
II. REDESIGNING REGULATION
For the reasons discussed above, the regulatory responses to the finan-
cial crisis that purport to mitigate excessive corporate risk-taking by systemi-
cally important firms are unlikely to be sufficient to control risk-taking that
causes systemic externalities.  As a result, that risk-taking is likely to continue.
Indeed, those regulatory responses may be insufficient to control risk-taking
that hurts the firm’s interests, much less the public’s interests.  For example,
almost half of the thirty-six banks covered in a recent Financial Stability
Board survey failed to meet the “‘fundamental’ criteria for sound risk govern-
ance.”69  And J.P. Morgan Chase, UBS, and Barclays suffered huge losses
from excessive risk-taking or lack of risk-taking oversight.70
Whether or not more should be done to control risk-taking that hurts
the firm’s interests,71 more certainly should be done, in principle, to control
without consideration of costs and benefits. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13.
65 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13.
66 Cf. Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and
Macroprudential Perspective 3 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll. Working Paper No. 849, 2015)
(observing that federal regulators were misled about banking safety prior to the financial
crisis because the required bank leverage ratio “totally failed to capture the perilous state
of the US banks in [that] period”).
67 Id. at 12–13.  Professor Avgouleas argues “[t]here is evidence that leverage restric-
tions may not reduce risk” because “bank managers may be incentivized into choosing
[riskier] assets with more highly correlated returns”—thereby creating “perverse incen-
tives.” Id.  He additionally argues that even the new Basel III capital requirements create
“uncertainty [that] severely undermines rather than reinforces market discipline” because
“the Basel system of risk weights” is “excessively complex and highly difficult to understand
[and also] susceptib[le] to gaming.” Id. at 16–17.  That uncertainty, in turn, “will lead to a
near certain loss of confidence in the banking system” in the event of a crisis. Id. at 17.
68 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1466 (2016) (observing that countercyclical capital requirements may
not be feasible because it is “virtually impossible to know ex ante whether a financial cycle
is rational or merely a bubble”; and discussing how the misapplication of such firm-specific
financial requirements led to the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s).
69 Jim Brunsden, Banks Must Boost Risk Oversight After Trading Scandals, FSB Says,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-12/
banks-must-boost-risk-oversight-after-trading-scandals-fsb-says (quoting FIN. STABILITY BD.,
THEMATIC REVIEW ON RISK GOVERNANCE PEER REVIEW REPORT 2 (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www
.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130212.pdf).
70 Id.  In 2012, a J.P. Morgan trader, aptly nicknamed the London Whale for his big
positions, caused the bank to report its biggest-ever trading loss of $6.2 billion.  Also in
2012, UBS suffered the largest loss from unauthorized trading in U.K. history, $2.3 billion,
when one of its traders was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison. Id.
71 This Article does not focus on that question per se; it focuses instead on risk-taking
that harms the public’s interests.
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excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.  Section A
below explains why regulation should be appropriate for that purpose, even
though it is inappropriate to control most other externalities that result from
corporate risk-taking.  Sections B and C then examine and compare regulat-
ing-substance and regulating-governance options to control excessive corpo-
rate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.  Although financial
regulation traditionally regulates substance (such as imposing capital-ade-
quacy standards),72 systemic risk regulation should additionally focus on reg-
ulating a firm’s governance to better align private and public interests.
A. Additional Regulation Is Needed
Although in principle more should be done to control excessive corpo-
rate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities, one cannot merely assume
that additional regulation is justified.  Corporate risk-taking routinely causes
externalities,73 yet regulation controls few of those externalities.74  Regula-
tion cannot, realistically, control all corporate externalities.75
Nonetheless, for at least three reasons,76 regulation should require firms
to mitigate their systemic externalities.  First, systemic externalities “can cause
72 See infra Section II.B.
73 Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form
and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 144 (2004).  Most of “a corporate structure’s externalities
result from the limited-liability rule of corporation law.” Id.  For an analysis of whether
that rule itself should be limited, see Schwarcz, infra note 77.  Limiting that rule would
regulate the shareholder principals whose agents, the managers of systemically important
firms, this Article seeks to regulate.
74 Cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58 (1993) (“Even
if both parties to a particular exchange benefit from it, the exchange may entail the impo-
sition of costs on non-consenting third parties. . . . The problem of third-party effects from
exchange relationships is pervasive and not aberrational.  Almost every transaction one can
conceive of is likely to impose costs on third parties.”).  For arguments that corporate law
should be used to control externalities, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of
Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635, 1665–66 (2009) (arguing that because
“creditors were providing the bulk of the risk capital,” “[m]anagerial incentives can be
distorted significantly by the existing regime of shareholder participation rights”).
75 Cf. TREBILCOCK, supra note 74, at 58 (explaining that if externalities resulting from
everyday transactions justified prohibiting the exchange process or putting constraints
upon it, then “freedom of contract would largely be at an end”); see also R.H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988) (arguing that the existence of externalities does
not establish a prima facie case for intervention because government regulation is also not
without cost).
76 A fourth reason why regulation should require firms to mitigate their systemic exter-
nalities is that the financial crisis has established and solidified a norm that financial regu-
lation should address and mitigate systemic risk. See, e.g., Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel
Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 33 SEC. & FED. CORP.
L. REP., no. 11, 2011, at 1 (commenting that the United States has led the international
financial regulatory community in implementing the reforms agreed upon by the Group of
Twenty, or G-20, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and describing this regulation as
“focused on the familiar crisis and postcrisis themes of systemic and macroeconomic risk,
including regulation and resolution of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)
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much more harm than non-systemic externalities.”77  Because they impact
the real economy,78 systemic externalities can, for example, lead to “wide-
spread poverty and unemployment.”79  A prominent governor of the Federal
Reserve similarly argues that “prudential regulation [should] need to involve
itself with corporate governance” because “risk-taking” by systemically impor-
tant financial intermediaries “carries substantial potential societal conse-
quences.”80  Second, systemic externalities harm the public, as opposed to
private stakeholders who could contract to protect themselves.81  Third, sys-
temic externalities can, as this Article will show, realistically, pragmatically,
and efficiently be mitigated.82
For these reasons, systemic externalities should be distinguished from
other externalities for regulatory purposes.  I next examine how regulation
could further control corporate risk-taking that causes systemic
externalities.83
B. Regulating Substance
Regulation could control corporate risk-taking that causes systemic
externalities by imposing specific regulatory requirements,84 by making cer-
tain actions illegal or tortious, or by imposing corporate governance duties
and global SIFIs (G-SIFIs), bank capital requirements and supervision, derivatives regula-
tion, investment advisers, executive compensation, and rating agencies”).
77 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assump-
tions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21 (2014).
78 The “real economy” means the economic reality, such as a recession, that the public
actually experiences.  Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 206.
79 Id. at 207.
80 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools Midyear Meeting: Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation 7–8
(June 9, 2014); cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of
Banks, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 97–98 (2003) (arguing that it may be
economically efficient to modify the corporate governance of FDIC-insured banks to
account for systemic risk).
81 Cf. Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 106, 115 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2012) (arguing that corporation law should be able to impose rules to protect the public,
just as law otherwise protects the public—such as a municipal park rule that protects
residents of the neighborhood from excessive noise).
82 See infra Section III.B.
83 In a prior article, I made a related but narrower inquiry. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533 (2015).
“This Article does not examine all forms of optimal regulation that could limit excessive
risk-taking or its systemic consequences; its scope is limited to regulation that imposes per-
sonal liability to deter excessive risk-taking.  Thus, the Article does not consider, for exam-
ple, whether to break up systemically important firms.” Id. at 540 n.26.
84 For an example of how regulatory requirements can drive contractual restrictions,
see for example supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing how contingent
capital regulation motivates contractual loan-covenant restrictions).
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on the managers of systemically important firms.85  This Article refers to
imposing specific regulatory requirements and making certain actions illegal
or tortious as “regulating substance,” as discussed in this Section.  In contrast,
this Article refers to imposing corporate governance duties as “regulating
governance,”86 which is discussed in Section C below.
Financial regulation traditionally regulates substance because regulating
governance is thought to “weaken[ ] the wealth-producing capacities of the
firm.”87  The responses to the financial crisis discussed in Part I, for exam-
ple—including those that are designed to control risk-taking by aligning
managerial and investor interests—regulate substance.  The capital-adequacy
standards imposed on banks for decades under the Basel Accords regulate
substance.88  As this Article has shown, however, regulating substance has so
far proved insufficient to control the excessive corporate risk-taking that
causes systemic externalities.89
85 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Cri-
sis—Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 163, 168–75 (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds.,
2012).
86 Commentators have made a somewhat parallel distinction between external and
internal regulation, the former referring to standards imposed on a firm and the latter
referring to any interference with the firm’s internal operations, including limiting execu-
tive compensation. See Lee, supra note 81, at 124.  This Article’s distinction between regu-
lating substance and regulating governance—in which the latter refers only to regulating
corporate governance procedures themselves—attempts to be more precise. Cf. id. at 124
(calling the distinction between external and internal regulation a “distinction without a
difference”).  For example, limiting executive compensation in prescribed ways would be
regarded as regulating substance in this Article but as internal regulation under the exter-
nal-internal distinction.
87 Id. at 124; see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425
(2002) (pointing out that negative externalities created by corporate conduct should be
“constrained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and other forms of regula-
tion”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335,
380–81 (2015) (also contending that the most responsible, legitimate, and effective way to
control externalities is to have the “legitimate instruments of the people’s will, reflective of
their desire, set the boundaries for corporate conduct”); cf. Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), http://umich
.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf (arguing that managers lack the political legitimacy
and expertise to consider social interests).  In principle, I agree with these arguments,
especially where the regulation concerns routine externalities or externalities as to which
private parties could contract to protect themselves.
88 See, e.g., Heath Price Tarbert, Note, Are International Capital Adequacy Rules Adequate?
The Basle Accord and Beyond, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1771, 1778–86 (2000) (stating that the
“capital adequacy standards for commercial banks . . . prescribed a substantive set of risk-
based capital adequacy standards”).
89 See supra notes 54–70 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 19 30-NOV-16 9:06
2016] misalignment 19
Commentators have proposed other possible ways to regulate substance
to help control that corporate risk-taking.90  For example, regulation could
require systemically important firms to pay into a fund that would be used to
help offset systemic risks and costs.91  This would not only help to internalize
externalities; it also would motivate systemically important firms to monitor
each other, in order to avoid having to pay more into the fund, thereby help-
ing control each other’s risky behavior.92  Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) deposit insurance provides a precedent for this type of a
fund.93
Although such a requirement theoretically could help to control exces-
sive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities, it may not be fea-
sible in the near future.  Politically, although such a requirement was in the
bill that became the Dodd-Frank Act, it was deleted because certain members
of Congress felt (incorrectly in the author’s opinion) that the very creation of
a systemic risk fund would itself increase moral hazard.94  Practically, such a
requirement would need further analysis of, and also would need a consen-
sus on, how to calculate the required contributions.  Such calculations would
be needed both to make the size of the fund sufficiently viable for its purpose
and also to allocate the required contributions among the wide range of sys-
temically important firms.95
90 Only one country, in a limited banking context, has proposed imposing criminal
illegality.  The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England’s regulatory
arm, the Prudential Regulation Authority, have proposed regulations that would impose
personal criminal liability on bankers of a failed bank unless they could prove that they
acted appropriately.  Jill Treanor, Regulators Want Reckless Bankers to be Criminally Liable
Under New Plans, GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/
jul/30/regulators-want-bankers-to-accept-criminal-liability.  In protest, bank directors have
been threatening to quit. See, e.g., Sean Farrell, HSBC Directors to Quit Over Threat to Jail
Bosses for Banking Crises, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2014/oct/07/hsbc-directors-quit-jail-bank-crises.
91 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 102–03; Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note
46, at 1402.  This type of regulation ideally should be global to avoid prejudicing the com-
petitiveness of firms subject to United States regulatory requirements.
92 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 102–03; Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note
46, at 1402; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:
Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
151, 210 (2011) (arguing that a systemic risk fund “amounts to a mutualization of risk that
should encourage more cautious firms to press regulators to rein in firms and practices
that pose systemic risks”).
93 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 102–03; Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note
46, at 1402.
94 Gordon & Muller, supra note 92, at 208; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Identifying and
Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment of Our Progress, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 94, 103
(2011).
95 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE
PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 94, 108 nn.40–41
(Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., eds., 2010) (discussing these practical
considerations, and also suggesting that—so long as each contributing firm has enough
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Commentators have also suggested a so-called “Pigouvian tax” as
another possible way to help control, or at least to help internalize the sys-
temic impact of, excessive corporate risk-taking.  This is a tax designed to
“offset the effects of [a systemically important] bank’s actions on wider soci-
ety.”96  Along these lines, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has proposed
imposing a “systemic [capital] surcharge” on the largest banks.97
The practicality of a Pigouvian tax is unclear.  At least as proposed as a
capital surcharge, it could be difficult to impose on a systemically important
nonbank.98  Imposing such a surcharge on a bank would also be imperfect,
economists argue, because a capital surcharge is used to achieve two (some-
times) incompatible goals—“as a buffer against unexpected loss [and to]
limit risk taking.”99  To the extent it serves as a buffer against unexpected
loss, a Pigouvian tax would simply be a type of firm-specific financial require-
ment, which would not be central to this Article’s analysis.100
Tort law is also unlikely to control excessive corporate risk-taking that
causes systemic externalities.  As a form of public control through the com-
mon law system of privately enforced rights,101 tort law has long been a fun-
damental tool to impose personal civil liability to remedy harm for
unreasonable risk-taking.102  Its utility is limited, however, to remedying fore-
seeable harm.103  But systemic harm is rarely foreseeable.
Systemic harm instead affects a wide range of third parties in unpredict-
able ways.  Consider, for example, an individual who is forced to close her
family-owned restaurant during a systemically-caused recession.  Or taking a
more concrete example from the financial crisis, consider whether to impose
tort liability on a manager of a financial firm who, in the expectation of a
bonus, sells highly-leveraged types of risky asset-backed securities to sophisti-
cated investors, contributing to that crisis.  Tort law could not—and assum-
capital at risk in the fund—the government could supplement the fund to ensure that its
size is sufficiently viable).
96 Gianni De Nicolo´ et al., Externalities and Macroprudential Policy, 2 J. FIN. PERSP. 95,
103 (2014); Andrew G. Haldane, On Being the Right Size, 2 J. FIN. PERSP. 13, 16 (2014).
97 See, e.g., Haldane, supra note 96, at 16–17 (stating that a capital surcharge of over
7% would “remove 90% of the systemic externality”).
98 Beatrice Weder di Mauro et al., Three Birds with One Stone: The G20 and Systemic Exter-
nalities, VOXEU (June 26, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/article/three-birds-one-stone-g20-
and-systemic-externalities.
99 Id.
100 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that
there are “two methods of public control—the common law system of privately enforced
rights and the administrative system of direct public control”).
102 See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 85, at 127 (observing that the concept of “[i]mposing
liability to pay the damages resulting from unreasonable risks . . . is a pillar of tort law”).
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2016)
(“To establish . . . negligence, it is not enough that there be a likelihood of harm; the
likelihood must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of conduct.”).
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ing legally sufficient disclosure, probably should not—be used to impose
personal liability on that manager for the resulting systemic harm.104
Regulating substance therefore is important, but it may be insufficient to
control excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.105
To continue to limit financial regulation to regulating substance would there-
fore create what Professor Ian Lee has called a “regulatory dysfunction.”106
To avoid that dysfunction, I next examine whether regulating governance
could help to control that excessive risk-taking without weakening corporate
wealth-producing capacity.107
C. Regulating Governance
Although regulating substance generally should be superior to govern-
ment interference with corporate governance to control externalities, regu-
lating substance has so far proved insufficient—and is unlikely to become
sufficient in the near future—to control the excessive corporate risk-taking
that causes systemic externalities.108  That insufficiency may well reflect the
reality that excessive corporate risk-taking primarily results from managerial
judgment calls.  For example, the excessive corporate risk-taking that led to
the financial crisis “largely resulted from poor decisions, bad judgment, and
greed.”109
To control that risk-taking, regulation also needs to regulate govern-
ance.110  In making corporate decisions, managers currently have a duty to
104 Cf. Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 46–47 (explaining that tort law usually does
not allow recovery for indirect losses, and also observing that it is difficult to impose tort
liability on a bankrupt firm).
105 Cf. id. at 38 (concluding that “it is unsafe to rely on regulation [that regulates sub-
stance] alone”).
106 E-mail from Ian B. Lee, Assoc. Prof., Univ. of Toronto Faculty of Law, to the author
(Aug. 18, 2015) (on file with author) (observing that “if existing legal obligations are an
important part of the problem, then we are in the presence of a regulatory dysfunction and
not a market dysfunction.  A logical possibility exists that the solution is not to introduce a
further intervention (new legal obligations), but rather to remove or alter the existing
intervention . . . that is, to weaken the managers’ existing legal duty to shareholders”).
107 Cf. supra note 87 and accompanying text (stating the argument against regulating
governance).
108 Cf. David T. Llewellyn, Some Lessons for Bank Regulation from Recent Financial Crises, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 428, 429 (Andrew W. Mullineux & Victor Murinde
eds., 2003) (“While external regulation has a role in fostering a safe and sound banking
system, this role is limited” and “increasingly important, are . . . corporate governance
arrangements within banks.”).
109 Schwarcz, supra note 83, at 538.
110 Cf. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1227 (recommending that derivatives clearinghouses
maintain “a separate governing body with a public charge—the containment of systemic
risk”); Peter O. Mu¨lbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 365, 385 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015) (suggesting that the
management of financial institutions be required “to take into account the negative exter-
nal effects of their decisions on other financial institutions and, thus, the contribution to
increasing systemic risk and reducing financial stability”); Tarullo, supra note 80, at 9
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the firm and its investors.  To reduce systemic externalities, they should also
have a duty to society (hereinafter, a “public governance duty”111) not to
engage their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to those externalities.112
So long as it does not unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity, regulating
governance in this way would help to align private and public interests.113
In the financial context, regulating governance has another advantage
over regulating substance.  Regulating substance often depends on regula-
tors precisely understanding the financial “architecture”—the particular
design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institu-
tions—at the time the regulation is promulgated.114  Because the financial
architecture is constantly changing,115 that type of grounded regulation has
value as long as it is updated as needed to adapt to those changes.116  But
ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory updating can be costly and “is
subject to political interference at each updating stage.”117  As a result, finan-
(arguing “for prudential regulation to influence the processes of risk-taking” to complement
“capital requirements and other substantive measures”).
111 This Article contemplates an actual duty on the part of a firm’s managers, in con-
trast to mere managerial discretion, to not engage their firms in excessive risk-taking that
leads to systemic externalities. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing for managerial discretion to act in the social
interest).
112 An alternative to imposing a public governance duty on a firm’s managers might be
to designate one or more managers (“public advocates”) whose primary duty would be to
represent the public, preserving the other managers’ traditional duties with one exception:
in any decisionmaking, the other managers would have the right to take into account the
public advocate’s viewpoint. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a
Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016–17)
(arguing that because bond financing now dwarfs equity financing and bond prices are
tied to firm performance, corporate governance should include bondholders, and sug-
gesting that including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic
risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders).
113 There is banking precedent that purports to regulate governance to align private
and public interests, but it is more precatory than real.  The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision sets corporate governance guidelines for banks in order to “safeguard[ ]. . .
interest in conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis.” BASEL COMM. ON BANK-
ING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 3 (2015),
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf.  These guidelines, however, merely require
banks to “protect the interests of depositors, meet shareholder obligations, and take into
account the interests of other recognised stakeholders.” Id.  For an argument in favor of
regulating governance to minimize corporate environmental externalities, see Gail E. Hen-
derson, A Fiduciary Duty to Minimize the Corporation’s Environmental Impacts (Univ. of
Oslo Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011–32, 2011).
114 Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 1443.
115 Id.
116 Cf. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER
OF LAST RESORT 4–5 (2011) (arguing that because economics and finance “largely ignore
the sophisticated mechanism that operates to channel cash flows . . . to meet cash commit-
ments,” they have not “been particularly well suited for understanding the . . . [financial]
crisis during which the crucial monetary plumbing broke down”).
117 Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 1443.
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cial regulation of substance usually lags financial innovation,118 causing
unanticipated consequences and allowing innovations to escape regulatory
scrutiny.119
Regulating governance, in contrast, can overcome that regulatory time
lag.  If the firm is proposing to engage in a risky project that represents finan-
cial innovation, its managers either have or, to fulfill their governance duties,
must try to obtain the most current information about the innovation and its
consequences.
III. TOWARDS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT: A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY
To help control the excessive corporate risk-taking that leads to systemic
externalities, this Article has shown that regulating governance has an advan-
tage over, and therefore in principle should supplement, regulating sub-
stance—so long as it does not unduly weaken corporate wealth-producing
capacity.  Subject to that proviso, managers should have a public governance
duty not to engage their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to those
externalities.  Because only systemically important firms, by definition, could
engage in risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities, the public govern-
ance duty should apply only to managers of those firms.
Section A below analyzes such a public governance duty under corporate
governance legal theory.  Thereafter, Section B shows how the duty could be
feasibly and efficiently implemented, without unduly weakening corporate
wealth-producing capacity.  The Appendix to the Article then proposes possi-
ble model language, in the form of a Public Governance Duty Act, for regula-
tion imposing the duty.
A. Analyzing a Public Governance Duty Under Corporate
Governance Legal Theory
Except to the extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy, a public
governance duty that aligns a systemically important firm’s interests with the
public’s interests should not be inconsistent with corporate governance legal
theory.  As explained below, it should be consistent with the stakeholder
model of governance, because the public is a stakeholder whom the law
should protect against systemic externalities.  It should be consistent with the
118 Id. at 1454; see also Edward J. Kane, Policy Implications of Structural Changes in Finan-
cial Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1983) (arguing that regulatory responses lag behind
innovations).
119 This occurred in 2008, for example, when the pre-crisis financial regulatory frame-
work, which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately
address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding had become non-
bank-intermediated. Cf. Julia Black, Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Char-
acter, Capacities, and Learning, in FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS
ANALYSIS 3, 13 (Eddy Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]he system simply did not operate in
the way that regulators, banks, and economists had thought it did.  If you do not under-
stand how the system works, it is very hard to build in mechanisms either for managing risk
or for ensuring the system’s resilience when those risks crystallize.”).
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more generally accepted contractarian model of governance because, even
though the public is not a contracting party, systemic externalities are exactly
the type of externalities that should count in limiting freedom of contract
that harms non-contracting parties.  And although it technically would be
inconsistent with the shareholder-primacy model, even that model recog-
nizes the need to control certain externalities—and a public governance duty
may be the best way to control the excessive corporate risk-taking that causes
systemic externalities.
1. The Stakeholder Model of Governance
A public governance duty should most clearly be consistent with the
stakeholder model of governance. Under this model, the interests of every-
one affected by a firm’s actions should be considered, to avoid anyone’s
interest being unfairly exploited.120  The public, of course, is affected by a
firm’s risk-taking.121  This model, however, adds little explanatory value
because there is fundamental disagreement on the extent to which non-inves-
tor stakeholder interests should be taken into account, valued, and balanced
with shareholder interests.122
Judicial opinions in the United States and Canada illustrate this disa-
greement.  In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,123 plaintiff
MetLife argued that RJR’s leveraged buyout caused the RJR bonds held by
MetLife to lose their investment-grade rating,124 thereby violating an implied
covenant to bondholders.125  As a consequence of the rating downgrade, the
120 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 447 (2001) (explaining that stakeholders may include “employees, creditors, cus-
tomers, merchants . . . or even broader interest groups such as beneficiaries of a well-
preserved environment”). But cf. Lee, supra note 81, at 111 (suggesting that stakeholder
theory does not necessarily imply that the firm has no bounds, i.e., that there is no distinc-
tion between the firm and the public; it need only mean that the firm’s interests are not
coextensive with those of the shareholders).
121 Cf. Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-conceptualiz-
ing the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Global Finan-
cial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 179–89 (2014) (arguing that the financial system and
economy qualify as stakeholders under a risk-based model of stakeholding).
122 Cf. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 578 (1998)
(observing a similar type of debate in bankruptcy law, in which different parties to the
debate start with very different norms).
123 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
124 For a description of how bond ratings are structured, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002)
(“[T]he highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings descending to AA,
then to A, and then to BBB and below. . . . The higher the rating, the lower the rating
agency has assessed the credit risk associated with the securities in question. . . . ‘Ratings
below BBB- are deemed non-investment grade, and indicate that full and timely repayment
on the securities may be speculative.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 253 (1998))).
125 RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1516.
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resale value of the bonds plummeted.126  MetLife argued that its damages
should include this loss in market value, but the court declined to recognize
that loss as legally compensable.127  The court implicitly acknowledged the
possibility that the bondholders were affected stakeholders.  It refused, how-
ever, to order compensation for the resulting externalities.128
The authority most clearly expressing a stakeholder model is the cele-
brated Canadian case of BCE, Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders,129 the facts of
which are virtually identical to those in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc.  Plaintiff-debentureholders argued that BCE’s board of directors
had acted inappropriately in agreeing to a leveraged buyout that would have
caused the debentures to lose their investment-grade rating, thereby dimin-
ishing their value.130  The court observed that the debentureholders were
warned that they could not reasonably expect the investment-grade rating to
be maintained, nor did they include indenture covenants to try to protect the
rating.131  Nonetheless, the court’s opinion broadly articulated a stakeholder
model of governance:
 Where conflicting interests arise, it falls to the directors of the corporation
to resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation. . . . There are no absolute rules and no princi-
ple that one set of interests should prevail over another.  In each case, the
question is whether, in all the circumstances, the directors acted in the best
interests of the corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations,
including—but not confined to—the need to treat affected stakeholders in a
fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible
corporate citizen.132
One prominent commentator, quoting a prior Canadian decision,
observes that such a stakeholder model of governance could even take into
account “the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, con-
sumers, governments and the environment.”133  Even in Canada, however,
there remains fundamental disagreement about how to apply a stakeholder
model of governance, including how to determine which stakeholders’ inter-
ests should be taken into account and how managers of firms could attempt
to value and balance those interests with investor interests.
126 Id. at 1506.
127 Id. at 1518.
128 Id.  The court’s articulated reasoning was somewhat tortured: the market-value loss
did not constitute the “fruits of the agreement” under which the bonds were issued
because the “substantive ‘fruits’ [of a bond indenture only] . . . include the periodic and
regular payment of interest and the eventual repayment of principal,” which were
expected to continue even after RJR’s leveraged buyout. Id. at 1518–19.
129 [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
130 Id. at 563.
131 Id. at 565.
132 Id.
133 Robert Yalden, Canadian Mergers and Acquisitions at the Crossroads: The Regulation of
Defence Strategies After BCE, 55 CAN. BUS. L.J. 389, 407 (2014).
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The Article next argues, in the context of discussing the contractarian
model of governance, that this disagreement reflects a larger uncertainty
about the extent to which law should protect third parties from externali-
ties.134  That larger uncertainty is a fundamental inquiry of contract law.
Insights from contract law can help to reveal, at least in the context of sys-
temic externalities, how that uncertainty can be resolved.
2. The Contractarian Model of Governance
This model reflects the most widely accepted theory of corporate govern-
ance—that a firm is a “nexus of contracts” among private parties.135  The
corporate governance rules are priced as part of the contractual negotia-
tion.136  At first glance, a public governance duty would appear to be incon-
sistent with this model.  After all, members of the public are not contracting
parties.
Contract law, however, does not limit its application to contracting par-
ties.  Freedom of contracting is not, and should not be, absolute.  Govern-
ment should be able to limit it in at least three scenarios,137 one of which is
when the contracting causes externalities.138  The critical question is which
externalities should count in limiting that freedom.139
Even under contract law, there is no absolute answer to that question.140
Some scholars have therefore dismissed externalities as a basis for regula-
tion.141  But this Article need answer only a much more limited question:
Should systemic externalities count in limiting freedom of contract?  That
question has already been answered in a separate context.142  Systemic exter-
nalities not only harm the public, who cannot contract to protect them-
134 Cf. TREBILCOCK, supra note 74, at 20 (identifying the “major conceptual” problem of
“[d]etermining . . . which [externalities] are to count in constraining the ability of parties
to contract with each other”).  After all, the stakeholder-model debate ultimately turns on
the extent to which law should require a firm’s managers to protect non-investor parties
who could be impacted by a corporate action.
135 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1426 (1989).
136 Id. at 1430.
137 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77
TEX. L. REV. 515 (1999) (arguing that freedom of contract should be subject to statutory
policies, paternalism, and material externalities).
138 Id. at 520–21.
139 TREBILCOCK, supra note 74, at 58–59 (raising that question).
140 Id. at 59–61 (explaining that different value judgments have different implications
for answering that question).
141 Cf. Alan D. Morrison, Meta Contracting and Autonomy: A Liberal Theory of the
Firm 2 (May 2015) (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (observing that “many people
now argue that regulation based solely upon the correction of externalities has been
proved to be inadequate”).
142 That separate context was examining whether regulation should require firms to
mitigate their systemic externalities. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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selves,143 but also cause much more harm than non-systemic externalities,
including widespread poverty and unemployment.144  These are exactly the
type of externalities that should count in limiting freedom of contract.145
Thus, even though the public is not a contracting party, a contractarian
model of corporate governance should permit—and arguably should even
require—government to limit corporate governance decisions that cause sys-
temic externalities to the public.
3. The Shareholder-Primacy Model
A public governance duty technically would be inconsistent with the
shareholder-primacy model.  This model is not a corporate governance the-
ory per se, but its widespread dominance in the United States146 and world-
wide147 merits attention.
Proponents of shareholder primacy argue that managers of for-profit
corporations should govern the firm solely for the best interests of its share-
holders.148  Although this model is sometimes discussed in a broader context
of economic efficiency, it is fundamentally based on agency costs.149  Because
firms and their agents cannot enter into complete contracts to prevent the
latter from shirking,150 there should be another way to prevent that.151
Shareholders as residual claimants have incentives to monitor the firm’s
agents.152  The agents, in turn, benefit from that monitoring because they
143 Cf. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (1996)
(leaving open the possibility that government intervention might be justified to prevent
externalities that cannot be internalized through Coasian bargaining); Morrison, supra
note 141, at 21–23 (observing that firms impose costs on the public that are “not knowingly
assumed”).
144 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
145 Schwarcz, supra note 137, at 520–21, 534–36, 551; see also Butler & Macey, supra
note 143, at 29 (arguing, in the environmental context, that government regulation may
be appropriate to require a polluter to bear the full costs of its activities when the external-
ity is significant and cannot be bargained away, and the benefits of the regulation outweigh
the costs); Morrison, supra note 141, at 22–23 (arguing that when the public is unable to
contract to avoid costs imposed by firms, the “regulatory state should minimize” those
costs, representing the public as part of a “meta contract”).
146 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (explaining
shareholder primacy’s classical articulation).
147 Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 120, at 443–48 (discussing the ideological
convergence on the shareholder-primacy model around the world).
148 Strine & Walter, supra note 87, at 346.
149 Agency costs are an aspect of economic efficiency; efficiency increases when agency
costs are minimized (because agency costs are a deadweight loss).
150 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
151 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 566 (2003).
152 Id. at 567.
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need focus on only one goal: maximizing shareholder value (usually in the
form of stock price).153
A public governance duty should nonetheless be consistent with certain
assumptions underlying the shareholder-primacy model.  Even proponents
of shareholder primacy accept that firms can cause externalities, but they
believe the efficient response is for government to regulate externalities, as
needed, without interfering with corporate governance.154  This Article has
shown, however, that such regulation may be insufficient to control the
excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.155  The
alternative is to regulate corporate governance.156
The analysis has shown that imposing a public governance duty to align
the firm’s interests with the public’s interests in order to control systemic
externalities can be reconciled with corporate governance legal theory.  I
next examine how to implement such a duty without unduly weakening cor-
porate wealth-producing capacity.
B. Implementing a Public Governance Duty
The discussion below shows that a public governance duty could be feasi-
bly and efficiently implemented.  Under a public governance duty, the man-
agers of a systemically important firm157 would not only have a private
corporate governance duty to investors but also a duty not to engage in exces-
sive risk-taking that could systemically harm the public.158  That public duty
153 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189, 1200 (2002).
154 Cf. generally supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
government interference with corporate governance might weaken the wealth-producing
capacities of the firm).
155 See supra Section II.B.
156 See supra Section II.C.  One can also make other arguments that a public govern-
ance duty should not be inconsistent with the shareholder-primacy model, including that
such a duty’s reduction in systemic cost would exceed any increase in agency costs resulting
from the duty.  Professor Morrison argues that state intervention—which implicitly would
include a public governance duty—would undermine the moral value of the corporate
form, which allows “choices that individuals, left to themselves, might prefer to make.”
Morrison, supra note 141, at 4.  I would argue to the contrary, that individuals should have
no moral right to cause systemic harm to others.
157 Recall that a public governance duty should apply only to managers of systemically
important firms, which in this Article are limited to financial firms that are systemically
important. See supra note 5 and the introduction to Section III.A.
158 Cf. John Carney, Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second Place, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-bank-board-game-puts-shareholders-in-
second-place-heard-on-the-street-1428255363 (noting a speech by U.S. Federal Reserve
Governor Daniel Tarullo suggesting that “corporate governance would need to change to
broaden the scope of boards’ fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [i.e., systemic]
regulatory objectives”).  The nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation that appears
to require, at least in principle, the managers of at least certain systemically important
firms to “operate[ ] [their firms] . . . in the interests of . . . shareholders . . . and the entire
economy.”  Act on Financial Undertakings (Act No. 161/2002) (Ice.), https://eng.atvinnu
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raises at least six practical questions: (1) How should a public governance
duty be legally imposed?  (2) How should managers assess the public costs
and private benefits of a risk-taking activity?  (3) How should managers bal-
ance those costs and benefits when deciding whether the firm should engage
in a given risk-taking activity?  (4) How should a public governance duty be
enforced?  (5) Weighing the goals of protecting the public against systemic
externalities and encouraging the best people to serve as managers, to what
extent should managers performing their public governance duty have the
protection of a business judgment rule as a defense to liability?  (6) To what
extent should managers be protected under directors and officers (D&O)
liability insurance?  Consider these questions in turn.
1. Legally Imposing the Duty
A public governance duty could be legally imposed in different ways.
Courts, for example, could create such a duty through judicial decisions.  Or
legislatures could amend their corporation laws to require such a duty.
Because this Article is primarily normative, its emphasis is on whether
the duty should be imposed, not how it might be imposed.  Nonetheless, the
following observations may be relevant to that latter inquiry.  As at least one
commentator has observed, changes in corporate governance law that could
have “profound public policy” implications that “ultimately shape the fabric
of the form of capitalism that a society embraces” should be undertaken by
“our legislatures,” which are “designed to allow for a full airing of social and
political currents.”159
In the United States, this would mean that a public governance duty
should be imposed either by state legislatures (especially the Delaware legis-
lature, because most domestic firms are incorporated under Delaware law) or
by the U.S. Congress (“Congress”).  Because corporation law in the United
States is traditionally state, not federal, states ideally should take the lead in
imposing such a duty.  By analogy, states are already beginning to allow cor-
porate managers to consider non-shareholder constituencies, such as
“employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and . . .
communities.”160
It is questionable, however, whether state legislatures are well-positioned
to impose a public governance duty.  They are unlikely to want to impose
such a duty because it could discourage firms from incorporating in their
vegaraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/nr/7366 (unofficial English translation pro-
vided by Icelandic government).  The Dean of the University of Iceland’s law faculty
believes this law “puts clear constraints on the directors and managers” of those firms and
“underlines the difference between” those firms “and other companies that usually have
the only purpose of increasing shareholder value.”  E-mail from Eyvindur G. Gunnarsson,
Dean, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Ice., to author (Feb. 14, 2015) (on file with author).
159 Yalden, supra note 133, at 410.
160 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2016).
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states.161  Furthermore, systemic risk is a national and international problem,
not usually a local state problem.162  The “internalization principle” recog-
nizes that regulatory responsibilities should generally be assigned to the unit
of government that best internalizes the full costs of the underlying regulated
activity.163  For these reasons, Congress may be best situated to impose a pub-
lic governance duty,164 and indeed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-
Frank Act set legislative precedents for Congress limiting state corporation
law.165  A federal law public governance duty would also override inconsis-
tent state corporation law.166
Congress might already implicitly have granted power to the Federal
Reserve to create a public governance duty.  Section 165(h) of the Dodd-
Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve Board to require each publicly traded
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board and each publicly
traded bank holding company with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or
more to establish a risk committee, which will be responsible for overseeing
161 Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 75 (observing that “systemically important
firms might be expected to incorporate away from jurisdictions adopting a [director] liabil-
ity rule”).
162 In the corporate governance context, this disconnect is potentially even greater
because firms operating anywhere in the United States can select another state’s law under
which to incorporate, and that law will control the firm’s governance.  Therefore, a state’s
corporate governance law need not even take that state’s risks into account.
163 Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 137 (2010); see also Enhanced Prudential Standards
for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240,
17,249 (Mar. 14, 2014); Clayton P. Gillette, Who Should Authorize a Commuter Tax?, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 223, 233 (2010).  The internalization principle’s rationale is that government
entities will have optimal incentives to take into account the full costs and benefits of their
regulatory decisions only if the impacts of those decisions are felt entirely within their
jurisdictions. WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 46–47 (1972).
164 Cf. Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 68 (proposing that implementing director
liability for systemic harm could require “a Federal liability regime”).  Professors Armour
and Gordon also suggest that “the mere possibility of federal intervention could itself spur
Delaware” to impose something akin to a public governance duty, because “the most pow-
erful driver of innovation in Delaware corporate law has . . . been . . . the threat of federal
pre-emption.” Id. at 75.
165 Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1014 (2013) (discuss-
ing those Acts as federal legislative precedents in which Congress limited how state corpo-
ration law enabled corporate private ordering).  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley requires a
public company’s audit committee members to be independent and makes specific manag-
ers individually responsible for the accuracy of financial reports. Id. at 1021.  Dodd-Frank
requires the directors on the compensation committee to be independent and also,
through its “say-on-pay” provisions, requires precatory shareholder approval of the substan-
tive terms of executive compensation. Id. at 1027–29.
166 See infra note 170.  For example, a federal law public governance duty would over-
ride a disclaimer of liability for gross negligence included in a firm’s certificate of incorpo-
ration under Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE. ANN. § 102(b)(7) (West
2015).
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the company’s risk management practices.167  The Board’s implementing
regulations currently only require risk committees to focus on risks to the
firm, not to the public.168  That microprudential focus subjects risk commit-
tees to the same misalignment discussed earlier.169  As a result, members of a
risk committee who vote to favor the public over investor interests may even
be violating their state law corporate governance duties.  However, assuming
Congress’s mandate to the Board is broad enough, the Board could issue
additional regulations that require risk committees to also consider systemic
risks to the public.170
167 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h) (2012) (stating that the risk committee should be responsible
for overseeing the firm’s enterprise-wide risk management practices—i.e., overseeing the
broad spectrum of risks facing the firm and the firm’s affiliated group).  The risk commit-
tee is also required to have independent directors (as the Federal Reserve Board deems
appropriate), including at least one risk management expert having experience in identify-
ing, assessing, and managing risk exposures of large, complex firms. Id.  For further dis-
cussion of risk committees, see Kristin N. Johnson & Steven A. Ramirez, New Guiding
Principles: Macroprudential Solutions to Risk Management Oversight and Systemic Risk Concerns, 11
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386, 416–18 (2014).
168 The Federal Reserve Board’s regulations do not require risk committees to take
systemic risk into account. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.20–22, 30–35 (2015) (at most indirectly
suggesting that possibility by requiring that the level of risk management expertise pos-
sessed by the risk committee of a company should rise in accordance with a company’s
rising threat of systemic risk to the economy).  Risk committees formed pursuant to the
Board’s regulations likewise do not appear to take systemic risk into account. See, e.g.,
MAUREEN P. ERRITY & HENRY J. RISTUCCIA, DELOITTE, RISK COMMITTEE RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
BOARDS app. A at 18–20 (2012) (stating in its “[s]ample board risk committee charter” that
the risk committee’s purpose is to identify and assess “the risks that the organization faces”
and to “[p]rovide input to management regarding the enterprise’s risk appetite and toler-
ance”); Matteo Tonello, Should Your Board Have a Separate Risk Committee?, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 12, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/
02/12/should-your-board-have-a-separate-risk-committee/ (stating that the risk commit-
tee’s function is to “develop a mutual understanding regarding the risks the company faces
over time as it executes its business model for creating enterprise value”).
169 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.  Although that microprudential focus
reduces the likelihood that individual firms will fail, that at most partially reduces systemic
risk. See supra note 15.
170 During an October 19, 2015, presentation on “Regulating Systemic Risk in Insur-
ance,” I suggested to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and Reserve Bank staff that they
should consider requiring risk committees to also consider systemic risks to the public.  If
the delegation of authority under section 165(h) of the Dodd-Frank Act is broad enough,
the Board’s regulations requiring a public governance duty should override contrary state
law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Cf. Peter O. Mu¨lbert &
Alexander Wilhelm, CRD IV Framework for Banks’ Corporate Governance, in EUROPEAN BANK-
ING UNION 155, 197 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2015) (stating that the new
European Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV “requires the decisions of . . . the
management body . . . to take into account not only the interests of shareholders, but
also . . . the public interest”).
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2. Assessing Costs and Benefits
How should managers of a systemically important firm, or members of
such a firm’s risk committee,171 assess the public costs and private benefits of
a risk-taking activity?  Although a range of approaches is possible, this Article
offers two examples of approaches: one subjective and the other more objec-
tive and ministerial.  On a case-by-case basis, managers could choose which
approach to follow.
When deciding how to vote on matters as to which they believe there
could be significant systemic costs to the public, managers following a subjec-
tive approach would simply consider those costs and balance them against
benefits—the same way they would consider any other relevant costs and
benefits when making a corporate governance decision.  Their assessment
and balancing might, but would not necessarily, be documented or
explained.172  Managers may favor this approach because it would not
change their current behavior.
This subjective approach would be subject to at least three drawbacks,
however.173  First, because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be
devastating to the public, the decisionmaking process to mitigate that harm
should be more transparent.174  Second, managers following a subjective
approach may be subject to peer pressure to favor investor profitability over
avoiding public harm.175  Third, although courts generally try to avoid sec-
ond-guessing management decisions,176 even managers should want to fol-
low an approach that provides an explicit safe harbor against litigation—at
least if the approach is relatively ministerial.
171 See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (discussing risk committees).  Profes-
sors Armour and Gordon also advocate “board-level review of risk-taking that may give rise
to systemic harms, effectuated through a risk-committee process.”  Armour & Gordon,
supra note 37, at 64.  Even if the cost-benefit assessment is performed by members of a
firm’s risk committee, the firm’s senior managers (e.g., members of its board of directors)
“should retain overall responsibility for risk oversight, mirroring [their] overall responsibil-
ity for strategy.”  Tonello, supra note 168.
172 Cf. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 191 (2d ed. 2003) (observ-
ing that “what is required for the board to act reasonably to inform itself varies with the
facts”).
173 The more objective approach also could have drawbacks, such as its simplifying
assumption that the only way a risky project could cause systemic costs is if the project’s
being unsuccessful causes the firm to fail. See infra note 178.
174 Cf. infra notes 189–93 (arguing that the harmful consequences of a systemic col-
lapse justify the application of a precautionary principle).
175 As a director of special purpose entities, I routinely experienced this peer pressure.
I also saw this type of peer pressure routinely exercised against the senior manager of a
banking client’s internal risk committee, to greatly favor profitability over caution.  To
attempt to mitigate this pressure, a firm’s risk committee ideally should have at least two
independent members.
176 See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment
rule as a defense to liability).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 33 30-NOV-16 9:06
2016] misalignment 33
Consider how to craft a possible ministerial safe-harbor objective
approach, using the generic example of a systemically important firm engag-
ing in a risky project that could be profitable.  The expected private benefits
can be calculated as the expected value of the project to the firm’s investors
(usually the shareholders), which I’ll call ″:
″ (expected value of project to investors) =
[X% chance of project being successful × $Y value to investors from that
success177] - [(1-X% chance of project being unsuccessful) × $W loss
from that failure]
The expected public costs can be calculated as the expected value of the
project’s systemic costs, which I’ll call $:
$ (expected value of project’s systemic costs) =
(1 - X% chance of project being unsuccessful) × F% chance of firm failing as
a result of the project being unsuccessful × $Z resulting systemic
costs.178
What values should management use?  Most of these values would be
pure business judgments about which the firm’s managers should have suffi-
cient information, or at least much more information than third parties.  For
example, those managers should have much more information than third
parties about valuing X%, the chance of the project being successful; $Y, the
value to investors from that success; $W, the loss from the project’s failure;
and F%, the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project’s failure (i.e.,
effectively as a result of the $W loss).
The exception, however, is the value for $Z, the systemic costs if the firm
fails.  Government financial regulators are likely to know much more about
valuing $Z than the firm’s managers.  That valuation should therefore be a
public policy choice.
As a policy matter, there are several possible ways of valuing $Z.  One
approach would be to assume that the firm actually fails, with a systemically
negative impact to the real economy.  That would yield an indeterminate but
177 $Y, the value to investors from the project’s success, could be measured by profit or
whatever other metric the firm normally uses.
178 This equation has been simplified in two ways.  First, it assumes that the only way a
risky project could cause systemic costs is if the firm fails as a result of the project’s being
unsuccessful.  Thus, managers would only need to engage in the assessment when deciding
on a risky project whose failure could, either itself or in combination with other factors of
which such managers are or should be aware, cause the firm to fail.  This approach may
miss other triggers of systemic risk, such as the negative effects of correlated portfolios. Cf.
Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 63, at 1595–97 (discussing the systemic impact of corre-
lated investments by insurance companies).  Second, the full equation would be [(1 - X%
chance of project being unsuccessful) × F% chance of firm failing as a result of the project
being unsuccessful × $Z resulting systemic costs] + [(X% chance of project being success-
ful) × A% chance of firm failing as a result of the project being successful × $B resulting
systemic costs].  However, A%, the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project being
successful, is likely to be zero.
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potentially huge number for $Z.179  But that valuation approach could be
misleading for at least two reasons.  First, the failure of any given firm, no
matter how large, would be unlikely by itself to be the sole cause of a major
financial crisis; even Lehman Brothers’ failure did not, by itself, cause the
financial crisis.180  Second, at least in the United States, the “living will”
requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act is intended to minimize the systemic
consequences of any given systemically important firm’s failure.181
A more plausible way to value $Z would be to estimate the costs of the
firm’s failure to its immediate counterparties.  The rationale for this
approach is that first-order systemic consequences are more likely to result
from a systemically important firm’s failure than a full-blown financial col-
lapse.182  Such a cost estimate was done by analysts at J.P. Morgan for the
possible failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge
fund whose losses in the Russian bond market brought it close to default;
they found that LTCM’s failure would have cost its larger bank-creditors
$500–700 million each.183
Another plausible approach to valuing $Z would be to base its value on
the estimated cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic failure.  Such
an estimate could be required to be made by the government, for exam-
ple,184 as part of the process of designating a firm as a “systemically impor-
tant financial institution” (SIFI),185 and thereafter periodically updated by
the government.
179 Estimates of the cost of the financial crisis are in the trillions. See, e.g., Tyler Atkin-
son et al., How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, FED.
RES. BANK DALL. STAFF PAPERS, July 20, 2013, at 1 (estimating the likely cost of the financial
crisis to the United States as “greater than the value of one year’s output,” or greater than
$15.5 trillion).
180 The shock caused by the Federal Reserve’s failure to bail out Lehman Brothers was
merely the final straw that triggered the collapse that led to the financial crisis. See The
Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, supra note 3.
181 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
182 The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to minimize systemic disruptions in the event of a
failed systemically important financial institution.
183 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPI-
TAL MANAGEMENT 190 (2000).
184 The process by which the government should make and periodically update such an
estimate is beyond this Article’s scope.  One way it might do so, however, is by attempting
to match the firm in question to the most “comparable company” that has received bailout
money in the past, based on its tracking of data for bailout recipients in connection with
the financial crisis. See, e.g., Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica
.org/bailout/list/index (last updated Oct. 17, 2016) (providing a bailout list, which tracks
every dollar and every recipient of federal government bailout money).  Of course, no
estimate would be perfect. Cf. ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 565 (4th
ed. 2015) (observing that a comparable companies approach is never based on exactly
comparable companies).
185 Such an estimate should, ideally, take into account both domestic and foreign
bailout costs.  If the United States is designating a global firm as a SIFI, the bailout cost
would include not only the United States bailout cost but also the costs of any necessary
foreign bailouts.
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3. Balancing Costs and Benefits
Next consider how managers should balance public costs and private
benefits when deciding whether their firm should engage in a given risk-
taking activity.  Managers following a subjective approach would simply bal-
ance those costs and benefits the same way they would balance any other
relevant costs and benefits when making a corporate governance decision.186
But that subjective approach would again be subject to the drawbacks that
the balancing process should be more transparent, that managers engaging
in subjective balancing may be subject to peer pressure to assign more weight
to investor profitability than to avoiding public harm, and that subjective bal-
ancing does not provide a clear safe harbor against litigation.
Managers following the ministerial safe harbor objective approach to
assessing public costs and private benefits could also use that approach to
balance those costs and benefits.  Using the earlier terminology, they would
be balancing ″ (the expected value of the project to the firm’s investors)
against $ (the expected value of the project’s systemic costs), recognizing
that a firm’s wealth production to society should be assessed net of potential
systemic costs.  Such a balancing would be needed only when deciding on a
risky project whose failure could, either itself or in combination with other
factors of which such managers are or should be aware, cause the firm to
fail.187  Managers should be aware of such projects.188
To ensure that the balancing does not unduly weaken corporate wealth-
producing capacity, it should be designed to yield an economically efficient
result.  From a strict economic efficiency standpoint, the project would be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if ″ exceeds $.189  As a public policy matter, however,
simple Kaldor-Hicks efficiency may be insufficient because the magnitude
and harmful consequences of a systemic collapse, if it occurs, could be devas-
tating.  When balancing the costs and benefits of activities that might pose
186 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  Managers making this determination
and the other determinations contemplated by a public governance duty would be pro-
tected, of course, by the business judgment rule. See infra notes 206–25 and accompanying
text.
188 Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 69 (observing that “it is surely the board’s
responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude and kind as to threaten the
firm’s stability”).
189 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the practical standard used by economists. ROBIN PAUL
MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL
REASONING 190 (2004).  A project is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if its overall benefits exceed its
overall costs, regardless of who bears the costs and who gets the benefits. Id.  Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency implicitly assumes that the distribution of benefits and costs is not controlled by
the party—in our case, a firm’s managers—also controlling the decision whether to engage
in the project. Id. at 190–91.  But those managers do not completely control the distribu-
tion of benefits; the public usually benefits, at least indirectly, from corporate risk-taking
that benefits investors.
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great harm, policymakers normally apply a precautionary principle.190  “The
strongest form of the precautionary principle”—under which “the potential
for great harm justifies any regulatory intervention, and/or that the propo-
nent of an activity must conclusively demonstrate that the activity is safe
before it is allowed”191—should not, however, apply to corporate decision-
making because it could stymie much reasonable risk-taking, thereby weaken-
ing corporate wealth-producing capacity.
It may be more appropriate to apply a weaker form of the precautionary
principle, which would merely require “a margin of safety” to demonstrate
that a given risk-taking activity is justified.192  Under this weaker form of the
precautionary principle, engaging in a project for which ″ considerably
exceeds $ should not constitute excessive risk-taking.193  This formulation
would not completely prevent risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.  It
should, however, reduce that risk-taking by including systemic externalities in
the corporate governance balancing, thereby also shaping corporate govern-
ance norms to begin to take the public into account.194
In examining how to apply this approach, assume for illustrative pur-
poses195 that a systemically important firm’s bailout cost ($Z) would be $500
million and that the firm’s managers estimate the other values as follows:
X% (the chance of the project being successful) = 80%.
$Y (the value to investors from that success) = $50 million.
190 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
173, 191 (2013) (observing that precautionary principles generally direct “regulators to err
on the side of regulating an activity when the outcome of that activity is uncertain, but
potentially irreversible and catastrophic”).  Although precautionary principles have been
mostly applied in assessing environmental regulation, they also can have application to
financial regulation. Id. at 191–92; see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 16 (2d ed. 2007); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal:
Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 84 (2012)
(“[A]dopting and operationalizing the general concept of precaution in the context of post-
crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a worthwhile, and even necessary, exer-
cise.”); Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 234–35 (applying a precautionary principle to cost-bene-
fit balancing involving systemic risk).
191 Allen, supra note 190, at 195.
192 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1014
(2003) (discussing this form of the precautionary principle, under which “[r]egulation
should include a margin of safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects
have not been found or predicted”).
193 The margin of safety, in other words, is that ″ does not merely exceed but considera-
bly exceeds $.  To provide more of a safe harbor for managers, the regulatory language of the
public governance duty could specify a percentage that is deemed to provide that margin.
194 Cf. Lee, supra note 81, at 124 (observing that “provisions embedded within corpo-
rate [governance] law might influence the managers’ conception of their role, with the
result that the norms underlying such provisions are capable of guiding managers even
within the gaps left by legal enforcement mechanisms”).
195 These values are solely illustrative.  They rely on no hard empirical data, and a quan-
titative analysis is no better than its assumptions.
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$W (the loss from the project’s failure) = $20 million.
F% (the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project’s fail-
ure) = 10%.
Applying these values yields the following:
″ (expected value of the project to the firm’s investors)
= [(80% chance of project being successful) × $50 million value to
investors from that success] - [(20% chance of project being
unsuccessful) × $20 million loss from that failure]
= $36 million
$ (expected value of the project’s systemic costs)
= (20% chance of project being unsuccessful) × 10% chance of firm
failing as a result of the project being unsuccessful × $500 mil-
lion resulting systemic costs
= $10 million
If these values are realistic, ″ ($36 million) would considerably outweigh
$ ($10 million).  Managers of a systemically important firm that undertake
this project would not be engaging in excessive risk-taking.
Much will depend on valuing $Z, the systemic costs if the firm fails.  If $Z
were $1.5 billion, rather than $500 million, the expected value of the pro-
ject’s systemic costs would equal $30 million.  Managers of a systemically
important firm that undertake the project might then be engaging in exces-
sive risk-taking because ″ ($36 million) would not considerably outweigh $
($30 million).
Because this balancing includes a margin of safety against systemic risk,
it could reduce a firm’s wealth production from a given project that is not
undertaken.  Nonetheless, the net overall wealth production to society, after
subtracting systemic costs, should be increased.196
4. Enforcing a Public Governance Duty
Who should enforce a public governance duty?  Under existing corpo-
rate governance law, shareholder derivative suits are the primary enforce-
196 The balancing also should satisfy what at least one leading civil law scholar charac-
terizes as the burden that should be met in order for financial regulation to favor general
welfare over corporate governance autonomy. See Matthias Haentjens, Party Autonomy, Pub-
lic Policy and European Bank Insolvency Law, (Hazelhoff Centre for Fin. Law, Research Paper
Series No. 7, 2015).  In connection with examining bank crisis management measures
under the Dutch Intervention Act, Professor Haentjens observes that private autonomy is a
“fundamental principle” of European Union law. Id. at 9.  Nonetheless, he argues that
“public welfare may take priority over party autonomy” if the regulation protecting public
welfare (1) unequivocally serves the public welfare, (2) proportionately and optimally bal-
ances public welfare against party autonomy, and (3) explicitly states that it is applying the
balancing. Id. at 11–12.  This Article’s public governance duty should meet all of these
conditions.
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ment mechanism.  Shareholders would have no interest, however, in suing
managers of their firm for externalizing systemic harm.  Therefore, the gov-
ernment, by default, at least should have the right to enforce the public duty.
The government, however, may be unable to effectively monitor a firm’s
internal compliance with the public governance duty until the firm fails,
when systemic consequences may be irremediable.  To facilitate better moni-
toring, regulation implementing a public governance duty should include
whistleblower incentives,197 including anti-retaliation protection for manag-
ers or others involved in the risk assessment who inform government officials
of their firm’s noncompliance198 and possibly also monetary rewards.199
Regulation implementing a public governance duty might even impose an
obligation on managers involved in the risk assessment to inform govern-
ment officials of their firm’s noncompliance.200
Another way to facilitate better monitoring, and more specifically
enforcement, of the public governance duty would be to incentivize mem-
bers of the public themselves.  Qui tam suits under the False Claims Act,201
the primary litigation tool for combating fraud against the United States gov-
ernment, constitute a strong precedent for this.  That Act permits private
citizens to sue alleged defrauders in the name of the government.202  If the
197 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank Act already protect
whistleblowers in the financial industry to some extent, including providing for anti-retalia-
tion provisions.
198 Informing government officials of one’s firm’s noncompliance is called external
reporting.  In principle, whistleblowers who engage in internal reporting—informing
someone within the firm, such as an employment supervisor—should also be protected.
Cf. Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing Effec-
tive Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 41 (2012) (“[A]n important principle for
designing reporting systems is that, under most circumstances, attempts to resolve compli-
ance issues should first be made internally.  Only if internal reporting fails or is deemed
impractical should external reporting to an administrative agency or another outside
authority be encouraged.”).  Managers involved in the risk assessment associated with the
public governance duty, however, will already be the most senior managers. See supra text
accompanying note 8.
199 The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, offers monetary incentives to whistleblowers and
allows them to commence actions in federal court without first seeking administrative
relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012); id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B).  A whistleblower who prevails
in court may receive up to twice the amount of wages lost due to retaliation, as well as
attorneys’ fees and ten percent to thirty percent of any cash recovered by the SEC based on
the whistleblower report. See id. § 78u-6(b).
200 Managers complying with this obligation should logically receive anti-retaliation
protection.  However, in some statutes, such as the Whistleblower Protection Act, a man-
ager who reports wrongdoing as part of his “duty” may be excluded from anti-retaliation
protections if the reporting is made in the ordinary course of the manager’s duties. See
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1167 (2010).
201 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
202 Id. § 1330(c)(3).
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suit is successful or settled, the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to thirty percent of
the award or settlement, plus costs and attorneys’ fees.203
Qui tam lawsuits raise a standing question; the citizen-plaintiff “suffers
no injury” and thus would appear to “lack the ‘injury in fact’ required to
create Article III standing” under the United States Constitution.204  None-
theless, the Supreme Court has found standing through a somewhat circular
argument—that the Act’s partial assignment of the government’s claim to
the citizen-plaintiff provides a sufficient stake in the outcome to create Arti-
cle III standing.205
That same circular argument could justify citizen standing to sue to
impose personal liability on managers who breach their public governance
duty, if those citizen-plaintiffs were entitled to a percentage of the award or
settlement.  Moreover, those citizen-plaintiffs would have an additional stand-
ing claim: as members of the public, they would be directly harmed by a
systemically important firm’s collapse.
Assuming that regulation implementing a public governance duty allows
qui tam lawsuits, regulators should provide for an ongoing study of those
lawsuits to ensure they do not overwhelm the courts or discourage good peo-
ple from serving as managers.
5. Business Judgment Rule as a Defense
A critical question concerns the business judgment rule as a defense to
liability.  In the traditional corporate governance context, managerial deci-
sions—including risk-taking decisions—are protected to some extent by this
rule, which presumes that managers should not be personally liable for harm
caused by negligent decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of
interest—and in some articulations of the business judgment rule, also with-
out gross negligence.206  Weighing the goals of protecting the public against
systemic externalities and encouraging the best people to serve as managers,
to what extent should managers performing their public governance duty
have the protection of that rule?
One of the business judgment rule’s primary justifications207 is an
attempt to balance somewhat similar goals: protecting investors against
203 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litiga-
tion, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1944 (2014).
204 Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 384
(footnote omitted).
205 Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
777–78 (2000)).
206 Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 258 (2014). But cf. In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) (stating that “grossly negli-
gent conduct, without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty
to act in good faith”).
207 The business judgment rule’s other primary justification is that the exercise of man-
agerial business judgment is inappropriate for court review.  Hurt, supra note 206, at
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losses, and encouraging the best managers to serve.208  Even though the busi-
ness judgment rule can reduce investor protection, that reduction is seen as a
necessary cost.  Because managers cannot always precisely predict the conse-
quences of their corporate governance decisions, some decisions that appear
correct when made can result in investor harm.  Without the business judg-
ment rule’s protection, competent managers would be exposed to liability,209
discouraging the quality of people who will consider serving as managers.210
In a public-governance-duty context, consider how to balance the paral-
lel goals of protecting the public against systemic externalities and encourag-
ing the best managers to serve.  The first goal, protecting the public against
systemic externalities, should be more important than protecting investors
against losses because systemic harm can be widespread and devastating.211
The second goal, encouraging the best managers to serve, should also be
more important; managers may find it even more difficult to precisely pre-
dict the public governance consequences of their decisions because it is
harder to predict systemic than ordinary consequences212 and also harder to
predict consequences to the public than to the firm and its investors.213
Managers therefore may need more encouragement to serve.
Because there would be increased importance for each of these compet-
ing goals in a public-governance-duty context, the business judgment rule
259–60.  This justification should be as applicable in a public-governance-duty context as in
a traditional corporate governance context.
208 See, e.g., Ryan Scarborough & Richard Olderman, Why Does the FDIC Sue Bank
Officers? Exploring the Boundaries of the Business Judgment Rule in the Wake of the Great Recession,
20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 377 (2015) (explaining that a typical justification for
business judgment rule protection is fear that qualified individuals will refrain from serving
as managers due to the significant liability exposure).
209 Cf. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 625–26 (unabr. 11th ed. 2014) (explaining that due to hindsight bias, people
often erroneously treat decisions that have bad results as bad decisions).
210 Cf. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Prog-
eny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 455 (2002) (explaining the highly
disproportionate incentives: liability for an imprudent decision could be in the millions,
whereas outside directors rarely receive fees commensurate with that level of risk); Scarbor-
ough & Olderman, supra note 208, at 377 (arguing that even management salaries pale
compared to the huge potential liability managers face after a crisis).  A related justifica-
tion is that the business judgment rule encourages appropriate levels of risk-taking. Id. at
378–79.  Without that rule’s protections, managers may be unduly risk-averse, thereby
avoiding risky but socially desirable economic projects.  Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra, at
455.
211 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (observing that systemic externalities dam-
age the economy and harm the public); supra note 179 (estimating the likely cost of the
financial crisis in the trillions).  Also, members of the public, unlike investors, cannot miti-
gate their harm by voting to replace managers or selling securities.
212 Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 93–96 (observing, among other things,
that we do not yet know enough about systemic shocks to prevent their transmission).
213 Cf. Friedman, supra note 87 (arguing that managers are experts in running the
company, not experts in improving social welfare).
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should still be needed to help balance those goals.214  The next question is
whether the business judgment rule should therefore apply to performance
of a public governance duty the same way it applies to performance of tradi-
tional corporate governance duties.
At least in a traditional corporate governance context—in which the first
competing goal is protecting investors against losses, not protecting the pub-
lic against systemic harm—scholars have rejected arguments to weaken the
business judgment rule for managers who engage their firms in excessive
risk-taking.  A weaker rule, they argue, would require courts to exercise inap-
propriate discretion, and it should be up to shareholders to evaluate corpo-
rate risk through their investment decisions, not through litigation.215  In a
public-governance-duty context, courts likewise should not be required to
exercise inappropriate discretion.  However, the argument that it should be
up to shareholders to evaluate corporate risk through their investment deci-
sions would be inapplicable because systemic externalities primarily affect
the public, not shareholders.216
Applying these scholars’ arguments to a public-governance-duty context,
it should be acceptable to weaken the business judgment rule for managers
who engage their firms in excessive systemic risk-taking if that weakening
would not require courts to exercise inappropriate discretion or discourage
the best people from serving.  Scholars who have examined corporate gov-
ernance from the standpoint of systemic harm likewise argue that “the case
for business judgment protection” is weaker.217  This Article next argues that
the public interest should in principle require a modest weakening of the
business judgment rule, if such weakening would not require courts to exer-
cise inappropriate discretion or discourage the best people from serving.  It
then proposes how, consistent with those goals, the business judgment rule
should be weakened, and also shows why the proposed weakening would be
consistent with the business judgment rule’s actual application in at least
some states, including Delaware.
The public interest should require a modest weakening of the business
judgment rule because public harm breaches one of the basic assumptions of
that rule’s application—that there be no conflict of interest.218  The interest
of a manager who holds significant shares or interests in shares, or whose
compensation or retention is dependent on share price, is aligned with the
214 Recall that the business judgment rule’s other primary justification should be as
applicable in a public-governance-duty context as in a traditional corporate governance
context. See supra note 207.
215 See Hurt, supra note 206, at 259–60; Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-
Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 120–21 (2010).
216 Recall that shareholders generally want their firms to take potentially profitable
risks, regardless of the possible systemic impact. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
217 Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 39.  They make this argument on the basis that
“diversified shareholders [then] want managers to take less risk.” Id.  Professors Armour
and Gordon also observe that “[d]irector liability is not an innovation in the control of
risk-taking by financial institutions.” Id. at 62.
218 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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firm’s shareholders, not with that of the public.  To that extent, the manager
would have a conflict of interest.219  Most managers are conflicted in that
way; they should not be given quite the same absolute deference that the
business judgment rule gives non-conflicted managers.
So how should the business judgment rule be weakened without requir-
ing courts to exercise inappropriate discretion or discouraging the best peo-
ple from serving as managers?  One solution would be to prevent conflicted
managers who are grossly negligent—that is, who fail to use even slight care
in assessing systemic harm to the public—from using the rule as a defense.
Technically, this solution does not even change the business judgment rule;
it merely applies the gross negligence standard that is articulated as part of
that rule, though rarely utilized with any rigor.220  Moreover, because courts
routinely review whether other types of actions are grossly negligent, they
should not find it “inappropriate” or impractical to review corporate risk-
taking actions under a gross negligence standard.  As a practical matter, fur-
thermore, managers who follow a reasonable procedure to balance public
costs and private benefits—such as the procedure discussed in this Arti-
cle221—should be protected.222  That would effectively conform the business
judgment rule’s public-governance-duty application to a duty of process care,
the standard commonly used in the United States.223
The requirement that managers use at least slight care in assessing sys-
temic harm to the public would also be consistent with the business judg-
ment rule’s actual application in at least some jurisdictions, including
219 Cf. Avgouleas, supra note 66, at 19 (arguing that “where managerial rewards are
contingent on shareholder returns, this naturally places limits on analyzing shareholders
and managers as distinct stakeholder groups within banks”).  I recognize that courts apply-
ing the business judgment rule usually look for conflicts of interest between managers, on
the one hand, and the firm and its shareholders, on the other hand.  Logically, however,
if—as this Article argues—the managers should also have a duty to the public, then the
notion of conflicts should be broadened to include conflicts between managers, on the
one hand, and the public, on the other hand.
220 Although gross negligence is articulated as part of the business judgment rule,
directors usually are not subjected to monetary damages for violating their duty of care,
even when they are grossly negligent. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, Directorial Abdication and
the Taxonomic Role of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Law, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 905, 911;
Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards and Antitrust Compliance,
58 S.D. L. REV. 499, 502 (2013) (observing that although it is included in the duty of care,
gross negligence “has almost no place in the life of a board member of a public company
because every state of the Union has enacted so-called ‘exculpation’ enabling laws that
permit corporations to excuse their boards of any duty of care”).
221 See supra subsections III.B.1, III.B.2.
222 See infra Appendix, § 5(a) of the proposed Public Governance Duty Act, which pro-
vides this safe harbor.
223 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (stating that due care in the
corporate decisionmaking context is process due care only, not substantive due care); In re
Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining
that the business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all
good faith board decisions).
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Delaware, that do not formally articulate a gross negligence standard as part
of the rule.  Delaware, for example, disallows business-judgment-rule protec-
tion for managers who act in “bad faith,”224 which is broadly defined as
including conduct that “is known to constitute a violation of applicable positive
law,”225 which in turn is interpreted to include a manager failing to take
“steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy” such a violation.226  A
manager’s failure to use even slight care when assessing systemic harm to the
public under a legally mandated public governance duty would appear to be
bad faith under those interpretations.
6. Protecting Managers Under D&O Liability Insurance
The final question is the extent to which managers who become subject
to liability for breaching the public governance duty should be protected
under D&O liability insurance, which indemnifies managers against personal
liability.  Although D&O liability insurance will be needed to incentivize
good managers and also to help ensure that sufficient funds are available to
properly incentivize private-action lawsuits, it might compromise the deter-
rent effect of imposing personal liability.227  Furthermore, because the harm
resulting from systemic harm is open-ended,228 insurers may be reluctant to
offer D&O insurance covering breaches of the public governance duty.  At
least one possible solution to these concerns would be to specify a limit on
the amount of the claim that could be imposed for breaching the public
governance duty and, like a deductible, to require managers to be personally
liable for some percentage of that amount.229
The discussion above is normative, attempting to neutrally balance com-
peting goals.  Under United States law, however, regulators are technically
required “to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States” with-
out consideration of costs and benefits.230  That law could be interpreted to
224 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(explaining that “[t]he presumption of the business judgment rule creates a presumption
that a director acted in good faith” and that “[t]he good faith required of a corporate
fiduciary includes . . . duties of care and loyalty”).
225 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996).
226 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
227 Cf. Richard MacMinn et al., Directors, Directors and Officers Insurance, and Corporate
Governance, 35 J. INS. ISSUES 159, 165 (2012) (observing that “[t]he major criticism of cor-
porate purchase of D&O insurance is that it creates moral hazard problems for” the man-
agers covered by such insurance).
228 Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 69 (indicating that systemic losses raise open-
ended director liability because they “cannot readily be quantified”).
229 The Appendix’s proposed Public Governance Duty Act accomplishes this in §§ 4(a)
and 5(b) thereof. Cf. Armour & Gordon, supra note 37, at 69 (arguing that capping direc-
tor liability by reference to income “will in most cases strike a balance between the desire
to enhance deterrence while avoiding strong disincentives to director service by the most
qualified”).
230 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13; see supra
note 64.
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favor the first competing goal (protecting the public against systemic exter-
nalities) over the second (encouraging the best managers to serve).231
CONCLUSION
Although corporate risk-taking is economically necessary and even desir-
able, it can sometimes be harmful.  There is widespread agreement that
excessive corporate risk-taking was one of the primary causes of the systemic
economic collapse that became the 2008–2009 financial crisis.  Most financial
regulation since the crisis is therefore directed at reducing excessive risk-tak-
ing by systemically important firms.  That regulation usually focuses on align-
ing managerial and investor interests, on the assumption that investors
generally would oppose excessively risky business ventures.
This Article argues that assumption is flawed.  What constitutes “exces-
sive” risk-taking depends on the observer; risk-taking is excessive from a given
observer’s standpoint if, on balance, it is expected to harm that observer.  As
a result, the law inadvertently allows systemically important firms to engage in
risk-taking ventures that are expected to benefit the firm and its investors
but, because much of the systemic harm from the firm’s failure would be
externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens
impacted by an economic collapse, harm the public.
Pragmatically, regulators cannot control the myriad harmful externali-
ties that result from corporate risk-taking.  But excessive risk-taking that
causes the failure of a systemically important firm could trigger a domino-like
systemic collapse of other firms or markets, leading to widespread unemploy-
ment and poverty.232  Regulation should try to control that risk-taking.  Post-
financial-crisis regulation attempts to control that risk-taking without interfer-
ing with corporate governance because financial regulation of corporate gov-
ernance is thought to weaken the wealth-producing capacities of the firm.
That sort of substantive financial regulation is certainly important.  The Arti-
cle shows, however, that it is, and inevitably will be, insufficient to control the
excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.
The Article then examines whether regulating corporate governance
could help to control that risk-taking, without unduly weakening corporate
wealth-producing capacity.  It concludes that managers of systemically impor-
tant firms should not only have their traditional corporate governance duty
to investors but also a duty—which the Article calls a “public governance
duty”—not to engage in excessive risk-taking that could systemically harm the
public.  Such a duty would help to align private and public interests.  It also
would help to correct another critical regulatory failure—that substantive
financial regulation usually lags financial innovation.  That regulatory lag
occurs because substantive financial regulation often depends on regulators
231 That law should not fully trump the first competing goal over the second because
protecting the public against systemic externalities requires at least reasonably competent
managers.
232 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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precisely understanding the particular design and structure of financial
firms, markets, and other related institutions at the time the regulation is
promulgated.  The problem, though, is that the design and structure are con-
stantly changing.  The public governance duty, in contrast, would overcome
that time lag.  If the firm is proposing to engage in a risky project that repre-
sents financial innovation, its managers either have—or to fulfill their gov-
ernance duties, should try to obtain—the most current information about
the innovation and its consequences.
The proposed public governance duty is designed to avoid weakening
corporate wealth-producing capacity.233  The duty merely requires managers
of systemically important firms to price in potential systemic costs when
deciding on risky projects whose failure could cause the firm to fail.  This
recognizes that a firm’s wealth production to society should be assessed net
of systemic public harm.  The Article’s analysis of the public governance duty
also informs the larger debate over corporate governance models.  The analy-
sis shows how such a duty would fit within corporate governance legal theory.
It also explains why systemic externalities should count in limiting corporate
governance autonomy (and freedom of contract).
Because the public governance duty is intended to have minimal impact
on existing corporate governance, this Article also examines such practical
concerns as how the duty should be legally imposed, how managers should
assess and balance the public costs and private benefits of a risk-taking activ-
ity, how the duty should be enforced, and to what extent managers perform-
ing the duty should have the traditional protection of a business judgment
rule as a defense to liability.  The last issue is especially significant because
qualified managers are unlikely to want to serve without that protection.
The Appendix below proposes a Public Governance Duty Act designed
to implement the goals set forth in the Article.234  Such a public governance
duty should significantly reduce, but it could not completely prevent,235 the
excessive risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.  Even if imperfect,
however, that duty should constitute an important first step236 towards
233 Read literally, however, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes a mandate on United States
regulators to reduce systemic externalities regardless of the costs of doing so. See supra
notes 230–33 and accompanying text.  This Article—and regulators generally—eschew
such an austere and unrealistic approach.
234 In the United States, certain of those goals might be able to be implemented with-
out the need for new legislation. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that the Federal Reserve Board requires risk committees of systemically important
financial firms to consider risks to the firm, not to the public; but noting § 165(h) of the
Dodd-Frank Act might already provide the Federal Reserve Board with a broad enough
mandate to require those committees to also consider systemic risks to the public).
235 See, e.g., supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing simplifying assump-
tions); supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of valuing $Z,
the systemic costs if the firm fails); and supra note 184 (explaining why “no estimate [of
$Z] would be perfect”).
236 There could be even weaker first steps.  For example, rather than imposing a public
governance “duty,” government could simply legislate a public governance “right” that
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shaping corporate governance norms to begin to take the public into
account.237
would permit, but not require, managers to take into account potential systemic harm.
State constituency statutes sometimes take that approach. See supra note 160 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Pennsylvania constituency statute).  Managers who then vote to
favor public over investor interests would not necessarily be violating their state law corpo-
rate governance duties.
237 This Article does not directly engage the broader questions of whether corporate
governance law should take into account other public interests, such as climate change
and environmental harm or non-systemic economic harm, when traditional forms of regu-
lation are insufficient.  In separate articles, I use this Article’s conceptual analysis as a step-
ping-stone to address these broader questions.  I also address the possibility of designating
certain managers specifically to act in the public interest in lieu of modifying the corporate
governance duties of regular managers. Cf. supra note 112 (observing that an alternative
to imposing a public governance duty on a firm’s managers might be to designate a public-
advocate manager whose primary duty would be to represent the public, preserving the
other managers’ traditional duties with one exception: in any decisionmaking, the other
managers would have the right to take into account the public advocate’s viewpoint).
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APPENDIX: MODEL REGULATORY LANGUAGE FOR
A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY238
Public Governance Duty Act
SECTION 1.  TITLE
(a) This Act may be cited as the “Public Governance Duty Act.”
SECTION 2.  DEFINITIONS
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the following defini-
tions shall apply:
(1) The term “business judgment rule” means the legal presump-
tion that a firm’s managers should not be personally liable for harm
caused by negligent decisions made in good faith and without conflicts
of interest.
(2) The term “director” means a member of a systemically impor-
tant firm’s board of directors or such other senior manager who shares
or otherwise has ultimate responsibility to manage the firm.
(3) The term “fail” means that a firm admits in writing its inability
to pay its debts; or makes a general assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors; or becomes subject to a bankruptcy, insolvency, winding-up, liqui-
dation, or other similar case or proceeding; or otherwise ceases normal
business operations due to financial distress.
(4) The term “public governance duty” has the meaning set forth
in Section 3(a) of this Act.
(5) The term “systemically important firm” means a firm that has
been designated as systemically important by [name of applicable gov-
ernmental body that is authorized to make that designation].
SECTION 3.  PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY
(a) THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY.  In addition to the duties a
director may have to shareholders or other stakeholders, each director of a
systemically important firm has a duty (“public governance duty”) not to
engage the firm in risk-taking that, viewed at the time of such risk-taking and
either itself or in combination with other factors of which such director is or
should be aware, could reasonably cause the firm to fail239 unless such direc-
tor (1) first performs one of the processes set forth in subsection (b) of this
238 For an analysis of the process by which this proposed Public Governance Duty Act
or alternative language stating a public governance duty could be implemented into law,
see supra notes 159–70 and accompanying text.
239 Cf. supra notes 178, 187–88 and accompanying text (discussing the risk-taking for
which managers should assess the public governance duty).  Directors making this determi-
nation would be protected by the business judgment rule.
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Section and (2) based thereon, determines that the firm should engage in
that risk-taking.
(b) PROCESS.  For each risk-taking described in subsection (a) of this
Section, a director shall perform the process described in either subsection
(b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this Section.
 (1) The director shall assess and balance the benefits and costs of
such risk-taking, including potential systemic harm to the public, in the
manner such director would lawfully assess and balance any other rele-
vant benefits and costs when making a corporate governance
decision;240
(2) The director shall assess and balance the benefits and costs of
such risk-taking, including potential systemic harm to the public, accord-
ing to the following methodology: [the Act could insert here, for exam-
ple, methodology extracted from this Article’s text].241
SECTION 4.  LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT
(a) LIABILITY.  A director who violates the public governance duty
shall be liable for up to [$250,000]242 per risk-taking.
(b) PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT.  [Name of applicable governmental
agency that is authorized to enforce this Act] (the “Agency”) may enforce
this Act by [insert appropriate administrative and/or judicial legal actions
that may be taken to impose liability or to restrain a risk-taking for which a
director has violated the public governance duty].243
(c) PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT.  A person may bring a civil action to
enforce this Act on behalf of and in the name of the Agency.244
(1) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially
all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be
served on the Agency.  The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall
remain under seal, and shall not be served on the defendant until the
Agency elects whether to intervene and proceed with the action.
(2) The Agency shall elect whether to intervene and proceed with
the action within sixty days after it receives both the complaint and the
material evidence and information referenced in subsection (c)(1) of
this Section.  Before the expiration of that sixty-day period, the Agency
shall (A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be con-
ducted by the Agency, or (B) notify the court that it declines to take over
the action, in which case the person initiating the action shall have the
right to conduct the action.
240 See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 171–99.
242 This number is merely suggested. Compare text accompanying supra notes 201–03
(discussing how to incentivize qui tam actions) with section 5(b) of the Public Governance
Duty Act (limiting director insurance coverage).
243 See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text (discussing qui tam actions).
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(3) If the Agency proceeds with the action, it shall have full respon-
sibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by any act of
the person bringing the action.  Such person, however, shall receive at
least [fifteen percent but not more than thirty percent]245 of the pro-
ceeds of the action or settlement thereof, depending upon the extent to
which the Agency determines such person substantially contributed to
the prosecution of the action.
(4) If the initiating person conducts the action because the Agency
declined to take it over, such person shall have the right to the proceeds
of the action or settlement thereof.246  However, if the action is dis-
missed or the defendant otherwise prevails, the court may require such
person to pay the defendant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if
the court finds that the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or
brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
SECTION 5.  DEFENSES AND INSURANCE
(a) DEFENSES.  This Act shall not restrict the availability of the business
judgment rule as a defense to liability, provided a director claiming that
defense either (A) uses at least slight care when performing the public gov-
ernance duty or (B) in good faith performs the process set forth in subsec-
tion 3(b)(2) of this Act.247
(b) INSURANCE.  A director who violates the public governance duty
shall be personally liable for at least [ten]248 percent of any liability award or
settlement against such director.  Such personal liability may not be reim-
bursed, indemnified, or otherwise directly or indirectly paid or hedged by
insurance (including directors and officers liability insurance) or any other
means.249
SECTION 6.  WHISTLEBLOWING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
(a) Each employee of a systemically important firm shall have the right,
and each director of such a firm shall have the obligation, to report to the
Agency any violation or potential violation of the public governance duty of
which such employee or director has knowledge and to assist the Agency in
an investigation of such violation.250
245 Cf. supra text accompanying note 203 (discussing citizen-plaintiff recovery in qui
tam actions).
246 See id.
247 See supra notes 206–26 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement to use at
least slight care as part of a business judgment rule defense).
248 This number is merely suggested. Compare text accompanying supra note 229 (dis-
cussing how much personal liability is needed to discourage violations of the public gov-
ernance duty), with section 4(a) of the Public Governance Duty Act.
249 See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text (discussing D&O insurance).
250 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (discussing whistleblowing).
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(b) An employee or director who acts in accordance with subsection (a)
of this Section, (1) shall not, on account of such action, be liable to any
person under any law, rule, or regulation or under any contract or other
agreement, and (2) may not, on account of such action, be discharged,
demoted, suspended, threatened, or harassed, directly or indirectly, or in any
other manner discriminated against, by such employee’s or director’s firm or
by any other person.251
(c) If the Agency finds, after notice and a hearing, that a director has
willfully violated such director’s obligation under subsection (a) of this Sec-
tion, it may impose a civil penalty against such director of up to [$20,000].252
251 Section 4(b) of the Public Governance Duty Act might also offer monetary incen-
tives to non-director employee whistleblowers, such as allowed under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)
(2012) in a different context.
252 This number is merely suggested.
